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of Property Law and Biotechnology
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[A]nd to ask gently, but in all sincerity, the ever-recurring query of
the ages, Is not life more than meat, and the body more than
raiment? 1
This Article examines whether property law provides an
appropriate forum for determining who should have rights in human
biological materials. The current conception ofproperty law is that
goods subject to it are allocated according to market norms.
Because of this focus, property law has difficulty dealing with nonmarket aspects of these materials.
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If all goes according to plan, scientists will have sequenced the entire
human genome by the year 2005. 2 The goal of this sequencing effort
is to furnish researchers and physicians with sufficient information that,
using the tools of biotechnology,3 they will be able to combat disease
and ailment through the synthesis of human hormones and enzymes, the
development of new drugs and, eventually, the use of gene therapy. 4
To accomplish both the sequencing effort and the ensuing research,
scientists will have to create innovations surpassing current technologies
as well as make significant discoveries. As these innovations and
discoveries accumulate and their importance becomes increasingly
recognized, individual researchers and their funding agencies are likely
to attempt to assert control over both the products of their discovery and
the profits to be derived there:from. 5 The extent to which society ought
to respect such assertions of control and the forms such assertions ought
to take are the subjects of this Article.

2. The year 2005 is the goal set for the completion of the Human Genome
Project, an international effort to map the genome. See CHRISTOPHER WILLS, EXONS,
INTRONS, AND TALKING GENES 10 (1991). Wills defines genome as "[a]ll the genes of
an organism, along with all the other DNA of the chromosomes." Id at 345.
3. Biotechnology has been defined as follows: "Biotechnology, broadly defined,
includes any technique that uses living organisms (or parts of organisms) to make or
modify products, to improve plants or animals, or to develop micro-organisms for
specific uses-including recently developed techniques such as gene cloning and cell
fusion." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-BA-337, NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND
CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT 24 (1987) [hereinafter OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND
CELLS]. It should be noted that, according to this definition, the effort to sequence the
human genome is, itself, a biotechnology.
4. See generally ROBERT SHAPIRO, THE HUMAN BLUEPRINT passim (1991)
(discussing the Human Genome Project and its implications for medical and other
research); WILLS, supra note 2, passim (discussing the Human Genome Project and its
applications). Gene therapy involves the addition of genetic material to a patient's cells
in order to alleviate the symptoms of a genetic disease. Id at 344.
5. Witness, for example, the transatlantic skirmish over whether the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) ought to apply for and be granted patent rights over relatively
short sequences of human DNA. See Leslie Roberts, Genome Patent Fight Erupts, 254
SCI. 184 ( 1991 ); Gina Kolata, Biologist's Speedy Gene Method Scares Peers But Gains
Backer, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1992, at Cl, CIO; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genes, Patents,
and Product- Development, 257 SCI. 903 (1992); Reid G. Adler, Genome Research:
Fulfilling the Public s Expectations/or Knowledge and Commercialization,257 SCI. 908
(1992); Thomas D. Kiley, Patents on Random Complementary DNA Fragments?, 257
SCI. 915 (1992); Gina Kolata, In Rush to Patent Genes, the Claims Get Smaller, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992, § 4, at 12; Leslie Roberts, Rumors Fly Over Rejection of NIH
Claim, 257 SCI. 1855 (1992); Leslie Roberts, Top HHS LawyerSeekstoBlockNIH, 258
SCI. 209 (1992); Christopher Anderson, NIH to Appeal Patent Decision, 259 SCI. 302
(1993); Christopher Anderson, NIH Drops Bid for Gene Patents, 263 Sci. 909 (1994).
Disputes have also arisen with respect to public access to DNA databases. See Eliot
Marshall, HGS Opens Its Databanks-For A Price, 266 Sc1. 25 (1994); Eliot Marshall,
A Showdown Over Gene Fragments, 266 SCI. 208 (1994).
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Biotechnological research on human tissue has two distinctive
characteristics relevant to the discussion that follows. First, many of the
products of such research are compounds commonly found in the human
body or are components of the body itself. Such products include, for
example, insulin and other hormones, healthy and cancerous human
cells, immunological agents, and DNA6 sequences that code for human
proteins. Second, these products are most often used in curing or
preventing human disease. 7 For example, scientific discovery has
allowed patients suffering from diabetes and similar hormonal diseases
to self-administer insulin and other hormones; physicians treat cancer
patients with various immunological agents; 8 and, should gene therapy
become feasible, physicians will introduce DNA sequences into patients'
cells in order to control genetic disease. 9
These two characteristics-that biotechnology involving the human
body yields products that a healthy human body naturally produces and
that such products are used primarily in the provision of health
care-together distinguish the claims of researchers in the field of
biotechnology in the human body from the claims of other inventors.
The human body and its components are substantially dissimilar from
the raw materials of most other research. Specifically, our culture and
society imbue human bodies and body components with a richer
significance than most material objects. In addition, given that the
products of biotechnology in the human body will be medicines and
other agents administered to living human beings, the safety of such
medicines must be ensured. Further, if human health is properly viewed
as a merit rather than a market good, ' 0 then it ought to be provided, to

6. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) contains the genetic material for most life forms.
7. In fact, human health care is the focus of most research and development in
the biotechnology industry generally. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, OTA-BA-401, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: U.S. INVESTMENT
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY-SUMMARY 3 (1988) [hereinafter U.S. INVESTMENT]. Approximately half of all researchers in the health field use human tissues. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN
TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 3, at 52.
· 8. Lawrence K. Altman, Cancer Patients Aided by Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
1992, at A18.
9. See, e.g., Richard C. Mulligan, The Basic Science of Gene Therapy, 260 Sci.
926 (1993); Natalie Angier, Panel Permits Use of Genes in Treating Cystic Fibrosis,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at A28. See generally WILLS, supra note 2 (discussing the
Human Genome Project, its origins, related technologies, and future applications).
10. See ROBERT G. EVANS, STRAINED MERCY: THE ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN
HEALTH CARE 63 (1984). The term "market good" refers to a good that ought to be
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some extent, to all members of our community regardless of their ability
to pay. 11
This Article explores whether, given these characteristics, property law
is the most appropriate way to allocate control over human biological
materials. Part I opens the discussion with a brief description of the way
property discourse treats goods made subject to it. Specifically, this part
examines whether property discourse provides a forum to discuss the
complex and diverse ways in which contemporary American society
values human biological materials. This examination is followed, in Part
II, with an exploration of some of the ways we do, in fact, value the
human body and human health, two goods closely allied to human
biological materials. In Part III, Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, 12 the only case in which a senior court seriously addressed
the issue of the ownership of human biological materials, is discussed.
The exploration of Moore leads, in Part IV, to a discussion of whether
certain values, such as dignity and autonomy, can be translated into
other values, such as market value. Since this Article concludes that
values are not translatable into others and that property discourse focuses
on market values, Part V considers whether property discourse is
sufficiently flexible to permit a direct examination of non-market values.

I.

THE NATURE OF

PROPERTY DISCOURSE

Researchers and those arguing on their behalf commonly express their
assertions of control over human biological materials in terms of
property law. 13 Property, whether in the form of common-law property, a patent right, or a trade secret, offers researchers a significant degree
of control over the subsequent use of their discoveries and the ability to
substantially profit from these discoveries. Property law is, however,
imbued with certain attributes that make its application to discoveries in

distributed on the basis of one's ability to pay. This point is raised simply to point out
that in many countries, including Canada, health care is viewed as a merit good. Id
11. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 86-91 (1983). The right to health
care has been recognized internationally, in human rights instruments, see, e.g.,
Organization of American States: Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 14, 1988, 28
l.L.M. 161, 164 (stating that everyone has a right to health, including primary health
care), and through the provision of state health care in most western countries, see, e.g.,
MILTON I. ROEMER, NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: THE COUNTRIES
(1991) (referring to Germany, Belgium, France, Japan, Italy, Greece, Spain, Canada,
Australia, Norway, Great Britain, New Zealand, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark).
12. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 936 (1991).
13. See, e.g., OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 3; sources
cited, supra note 5.
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the field of biotechnological research in the human body questionable.
Those who participate in property discourse, as developed in American
courtrooms, treat goods considered "property" primarily as market
goods. To those who engage in this discourse, market goods are
optimally 14 distributed through the auspices of the market which takes
into account all the values and disvalues pertaining to a good and
allocates the good in such a manner as to maximize overall value. The
human body and its component parts are not, however, market goods.
This is so because many modes of valuing the body cannot be translated
into or understood in terms of a market price. Similarly, human health
is a non-market good. 15 Since the aim of biotechnological research in
the human body is primarily the promotion of human health, biotechnological innovations themselves have a strong non-market component.
Interpreters of property law, should they treat the human body and
human health as subject to property law and, thus, as market goods, are
likely not only to ignore the non-market aspects 16 of these goods but
also to resist addressing these non-market aspects when they are
specifically raised. They will so resist because they believe that the
market is the mechanism best-equipped to deal with these aspects in a
neutral manner. This belief is the source of much difficulty primarily
because it prematurely arrests discussion in the courtroom about how
best to promote all of the values inhering in a particular good. Judges
and lawyers, wishing to appeal to neutral methods of choosing among
competing claims, rely on the market to balance the plethora of ways of
valuing a good. Since the market cannot sensibly assign a price to many
values inhering in the human body and human biological materials, 17

14. Optimal is used in the economic, or Pareto, sense of the word.
15. A non-market good is a good that ought to be allocated on some basis other
than willingness to pay.
16. A non-market aspect, or non-market value, refers to a way of valuing a good
in terms other than price. For the present, it is not suggested that such ways of valuing
goods can never be translated into a market price; it is only meant that one does not
normally attach a price to such a mode of valuation. For example, an office manager
readily translates her office's need for pens and paper into a market price but a lover
does not normally attach a price to the presence of her or his loved one.
17. The Office of Technology Assessment defines human biological materials as
follows:
What are human biological materials? Human bodies contain a number of
parts that can be useful in biomedical research. Healthy individuals continually
produce a number of replenishable substances, including blood, skin, bone
marrow, hair, urine, perspiration, saliva, milk, semen, and tears. Human
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such values will be ignored in the formulation of judicial opmions
concerning the body and such materials. Thus, by relying on the
market, we risk making judicial decisions that fail to adequately balance
the competing needs of members of our society with respect to these
goods.

A.

Propertys Inner Heart: Market Values

The academic literature affords little insight as to which interests
courts seek to promote in allocating property rights. The received
learning, extracted from this literature, is that the label "property" is best
understood as the legal conclusion that a good is, in some way,
valuable. 18 In what respect, however, the good must be valuable, and
thus be worthy of protection as property, is unclear. A good, after all,
can be valuable in myriad ways including its aesthetic attributes, its
ability to provoke intellectual insight, its provision of comfort, its
inspirational qualities, and its market price. For example, a building
may be valuable in terms of the beauty of its architecture, the shelter it
provides to its inhabitants, its quiet serenity that inspires creative
contemplation, its history, and its price on the open market. The
received learning fails to define which, if any, of these ways of valuing
a good, either singly or in combination, motivates courts to label a good
as property.
For this reason, in order to discover the basis upon which property
rights are in fact being awarded and balanced, it is essential to examine
case law. Such an examination reveals that courts find a good to be
"valuable," and thus worthy of protection as property, when its dominant

bodies also contain nonreplenishing parts, such as oocytes or organs, which
may either be vital (e.g., heart) or to some extent expendable (e.g., lymph
nodes or a second kidney). Finally, diseased examples of these body parts also
exist.
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 3, at 24. The Office of
Technology Assessment distinguishes undeveloped human biological materials from
biological inventions developed from such materials. Id In this Article, both
undeveloped and developed material are included within the definition of human
biological materials. This is done because certain substances, for example hormones, are
the developed products of biotechnological research yet identical, except with respect to
purity, to naturally occurring substances. In some processes, however, the products
developed through biotechnology are significantly different from their undeveloped
precursors. Such products are not included within this Article's definition of human
biological materials.
18. See, e.g., A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
107, 130 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the
Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L.
REV. 325, 364 (1980); Arnold S. Weinrib, Information and Property, 38 U. TORONTO
L.J. 117, 120 (1988).
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value to the parties is economic. 19 Where a party can demonstrate that
a good is economically valuable to that party-that the party will trade
in that good on an open market-courts are likely to award property
rights if to do so will enhance such trade. If, however, the parties
cannot persuade a court that their interest in the good is principally
economic or the court perceives that the allocation of property rights to
one or the other of the parties will, in fact, hinder trade in the good, the
court is unlikely to award a property right. 20
Despite the coupling of property law analysis with a good's market
value, courts appreciate that people value the good in ways other than
the good's market price. 21 Courts assume, however, that the price of
a good on the market reflects all such modes of valuation. 22 That is,
courts believe that a good's market price is epiphenomena! of all the
various ways in which people value that good. 23 In the market, people
attach a monetary price to the way in which they individually value a
good. This monetary price is a function of many factors including, for
example, whether possession of the good is essential to the way in which
the individual values the good and whether the individual values other
goods more than the good in question.
Consider, for example, several of the possible ways to value a
wedding ring. 24 The jeweler who created the ring is proud of her skill
as exemplified in the design and execution of the ring. The jewelry
store manager values the ring as a means to derive an income on which
to live. The wearer of the wedding ring values it, at least in the ideal
case, as a symbol of mutual love. Each of the jeweler, the manager, and
the wearer, although valuing the ring in diverse ways, will be willing to
pay some price for it. The price each individual is willing to pay will
be a function of how each values the ring. The manager, who views the
ring as merely a means to achieve an income, will attach a lower price
to the ring than would the jeweler, who views the ring as unique. The
jeweler, in tum, will attach a lower price to the ring than the wearer
since possession of the ring is essential to the way in which the wearer

34

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
This example is borrowed from Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood,

STAN.

L. REV. 957, 959 (1982).

1173

values the ring-as a constant reminder of mutual love----'---but is not
essential to the jeweler's mode of valuation-as a source of pride-since
the jeweler can be proud of the ring from afar. 25 Since the wearer will
be willing to pay the most for the ring on the market, the wearer will
come to own it. Through this process of individual assessment of
willingness to pay, the market ensures that the ring is put to its highest
use. 26
The market, as thus described, offers courts the opportunity to ensure
that goods are put to their highest use and to do so without having to
make explicit value choices. The market provides a mechanism through
which individual assessments of value, as translated into money prices,
are objectively compared. This comparison is merely mechanical and
involves no a priori determination of which modes of valuation ought to
prevail. Given this understanding of the market, the courts confidently
put aside any explicit evaluation of worth, trusting the market to rank the
ways in which the good is valued. 27 This has two benefits from the
courts' point of view. First, since courts refrain from making difficult
policy decisions-the ranking of modes of valuation-they remain well
within the boundaries of their institutional role: that of impartial
arbiters. They thus avoid any question of institutional competency.
Second, the market provides the courts with a relatively straightforward
method of allocating property rights. Courts do not have to struggle
with and evaluate a large variety of frequently conflicting modes of
valuation; they need only examine goods from one standpoint: the
economic one.
While a more thorough analysis is undertaken elsewhere,28 support
for the preceding analysis is provided by examining three decisions that
exhibit, in particular, the fundamental role that market values play in
property discourse.
B.

Chakrabarty: Turning a Blind Eye to Non-Economic Values

Diamond v. Chakrabarty 29 involved the creation, through genetic
engineering, of a new bacterium that digests oil spills. Chakrabarty
created this bacterium by introducing naturally occurring strands of

25. In fact, the jeweler may take more pride in the ring knowing that the wearer
sincerely cherishes it than if the ring remained in the jeweler's possession.
26. From the point of view of market analysis, the highest use for a good is exactly
that use to which the good would be put in a perfect market.
27. See infra Part III. .
28. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF
HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS (forthcoming 1996).
29. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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genetic material into the cell of an existing bacterium. The added
genetic material carried genes that enabled the bacterium to break down
multiple components of crude oil. 30 So far as was known, no naturally
occurring bacterium carried out this function. Accordingly, Chakrabarty
sought patent protection for his "invention."
The United States Supreme Court held that Chakrabarty was entitled
to a patent over his bacterium. The Court stated that Congress intended
that its patent laws be liberally interpreted so that '"anything under the
sun that is made by man"' would be patentable. 31 Patent rights are
essential, the Court held, to ensure inventive activity: activity that will
bolster the economy and lead to increased employment and better
lives. 32 To be sure, the general rule of patentability is subject to an
exception for phenomena of nature; 33 however, as befits an exception,
these phenomena were narrowly defined by the Court to include physical
phenomena such as new minerals and plants, and abstract ideas such as
the laws of gravity and of relativity. 34 The Court concluded that
Chakrabarty's bacterium was not a phenomenon of nature. No naturally
occurring bacterium carried out its function-it was the result of human
ingenuity and research. 35 In other words, the Court concluded that
goods found in their natural form and abstract ideas cannot be owned,
but goods that have been transformed from their natural state, or ideas
that have been put to a practical end, are patentable. This conclusion
was driven by the Court's desire to further the economic goal of
encouraging inventive activity by distinguishing between abstract
inventions or physical phenomena that promote such activity best by
remaining in the public domain and concrete inventions that best foster
such activity by being·subject to patent rights.

30. Id at 305.
31. Id at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952) and H.R.
REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)).
32. Id at 307 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,480 (1974)).
33. Id at 309. The Court noted, "This is not to suggest that§ 101 has no limits
or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas have been held not patentable." Id
34. Id The Court stated, "Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new
plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not
patent his celebrated law that E=mc2 ; nor could Newton have patented the law of
gravity:" Id
35. Id at 310, 313.
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Some of those opposed to Chakrabarty's patent claim argued that the
grant of patent rights in genetically engineered organisms could have
devastating social, health, and environmental consequences. 36 They
argued that the Court should not agree to Chakrabarty's claim without
first examining the effects that granting such rights would have on
human health, the environment, and respect for life. 37 They argued that
such an examination would lead the Court to reject Chakrabarty's claim.
That is, those opposed to Chakrabarty's claim argued that, to uphold the
values of human dignity, human health, and environmental concern, the
claim ought to be rejected.
The Court met this request to consider non-economic values with a
two-pronged response. First, it held that the non-economic effects of
granting a patent right to Chakrabarty would be minimal. 38 While the
failure to gain patent rights in genetically engineered organisms might
slow down the pace of research in this field, 39 no judicial decision, the
Court held, would "deter the scientific mind from probing into the
unknown any more than Canute could command the tides."40
Second, the Court held that it was not competent to consider any but
economic factors inhering in genetically engineered organisms. 41 Other
ways of valuing such organisms-for example, in terms of their effect
on health, the environment, and human dignity-were matters of "high
policy" that only Congress could address. 42 Because Congress had not
exempted genetically engineered organisms from the scope of patent
law43 and because Congress had employed broad language to describe

36. Id. at 316. The Court stated, "We are told that genetic research and related
technological developments may spread pollution and disease, that it may result in a loss
of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to depreciate the value of human life."
Id. See generally Sharon Kingman, Safety Concerns Halt U.K. Study, 263 Sci. 748
( 1994) (discussing the shutdown of cancer research project due to safety concerns); Eliot
Marshall, One Less Hoop for Gene Therapy, 265 SCI. 599 (1994) (discussing the removal
of the requirement that all gene therapy protocols be subject to public examination).
37. Id. at 316-17. The Court stated, "It is argued that this Court should weigh
these potential hazards in considering whether [Chakrabarty's] invention is patentable
subject matter under §101." Id.
38. Id. at 317. The Court noted, "The grant or denial of patents on microorganisms is not likely to put an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks." Id.
39. Id. This thought ignores the fact that those opposed to genetic research are in
favor of slowing down the pace of research. Id. at 316.
40. Id. at 317.
41. Id. In the words of the Court: "What is more important is that we are without
competence to entertain these arguments-either to brush them aside as fantasies
generated by fear of the unknown, or to act on them." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 318.
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patentable subject matter, 44 the Court stated that it had no choice but
to accord a patent to Chakrabarty.
Chakrabarty illustrates, in a context not dissimilar to that discussed in
this Article-human manipulation of genetic code-that courts willingly
entertain economic arguments in allocating property rights but refrain
from entertaining non-market values.
C.

Gilliam: Vindicating Artistic Integrity?

In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 45 "Monty Python,"
the British comedy troupe, sought to enjoin ABC from broadcasting a
television program consisting of significantly edited and rearranged
comedy shows written and performed by the troupe. The shows had
originally aired in England, under the name "Monty Python's Flying
Circus," pursuant to a scriptwriters' agreement between Monty Python
and the British Broadcasting Company. Under the agreement, the BBC
could not alter scripts submitted by Monty Python, except in minor
ways, unless it first consulted with the comedy troupe. The BBC also
had the authority to license the broadcast of the shows outside of
England. Apart from this authority to alter scripts prior to production
of the actual episodes and to license foreign broadcasts of the show, the
BBC retained no rights to the scripts.
Although non-commercial and some small commercial American
broadcasters had aired several "Monty Python's Flying Circus" shows,
the first large commercial broadcaster to become interested in these
shows was ABC. ABC hoped to broadcast excerpts from various
"Monty Python's Flying Circus" episodes. It therefore approached the
comedy troupe, seeking rights to such a broadcast, but was rebuffed
because Monty Python believed the proposed format to be too disjointed.
Meanwhile, Time-Life Films acquired the rights to the shows from the
BBC. In its agreement with the BBC, Time-Life was given the right to
edit the shows in order to insert commercials and to censor objectionable
material. (The scriptwriters' agreement between Monty Python and the
BBC had provided no such right.) Time-Life then licensed ABC to
broadcast the shows.

44.
45.

Id. at 315.
538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
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ABC proposed to broadcast a total of six half-hour "Monty Python's
Flying Circus" shows in two ninety-minute specials. Given that out of
every ninety minutes of broadcast time, twenty-four minutes are
normally devoted to commercials, Monty Python members feared that
the shows would be severely edited. BBC officials promised that the
shows would be broadcast back-to-back in their entirety. The troupe
accepted this assurance. When ABC broadcast the first of the two
specials in early October 1975, members of Monty Python angrily
discovered that ABC had heavily edited the shows in order to fit in
commercials and to remove objectionable material. The comedy troupe
felt that its shows had been mutilated.
When Monty Python later learned that ABC intended to broadcast a
second special in December, it approached ABC to negotiate a delay.
These negotiations failed. Monty Python then commenced an action to
prevent ABC's broadcast of the second special and any re-broadcast of
the first special. After instituting its action, Monty Python sought a
preliminary injunction to enjoin ABC from airing the second special.
The troupe argued that by altering the sequence of the original shows,
ABC had misappropriated the underlying scripts. These scripts, Monty
Python contended, belonged to the troupe. The trial court sympathized
with Monty Python's predicament, holding that ABC had severely
distorted the original "Monty Python's Flying Circus" shows. The judge
held, however, that Monty Python had not established its ownership of
the underlying scripts. The judge also found that ABC would be
irreparably harmed if it could not broadcast the second special. He
therefore refused to grant the requested injunction. Monty Python
appealed this ruling. By the time the appeal was heard, however, ABC
had broadcast the second special. Monty Python thus sought a
preliminary injunction to prevent any future broadcasts of the two
specials. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
granted this relief. 46
The facts in Gilliam have been set out in some detail in order to
highlight Monty Python's consistent concern over the presentation of its
work. In its scriptwriters' agreement with the BBC, in its rejection of
ABC's initial offer to broadcast segments of "Monty Python's Flying
Circus" shows, in its concern that ABC might edit the shows in order to
fit three commercial-free thirty-minute shows into a ninety-minute
special with commercials, and in seeking an injunction to prevent the
broadcast of the edited shows, the comedy troupe demonstrated a keen
interest in maintaining the artistic integrity of its work. While Monty

46.
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Python could have compromised this integrity in order to capture greater
profits - itcould, for example, have agreed to ABC's first proposal to air
the shows in edited form-the troupe decided not to do so.
Gilliam provides, as the above discussion suggests, an example of a
party seeking to use property law in order to vindicate non-market
values. Monty Python claimed an infringement of a property right in
order to preserve its non-market interest in its artistic integrity. Instead
of relying on this non-market interest to support its property claim,
Monty Python presented its case to the Second Circuit as one primarily
involving market values. 47
Monty Python claimed a common-law copyright in its script. 48 The
BBC's right to the recorded television shows did not displace this
copyright, Monty Python maintained, because the shows were derivative
of the script. The Second Circuit agreed that Monty Python retained its ·
copyright in its scripts and that the agreement between the BBC and
Time-Life did not derogate from this right. 49 The court found that
ABC infringed this copyright by editing the recorded shows without
having first consulted with Monty Python. 5° Copyright law is premised, the court stated, on encouraging the production of artistic work
by providing adequate market protection to the creators of such work. 51
ABC's broadcast threatened Monty Python's market interest in its shows.
By distorting the nature of the comedy troupe's work through substantial
editing, ABC presented Monty Python to its first nationwide American
audience in an unflattering light. Many members of the audience,
having never before experienced the comedy of Monty Python, would
have believed that the ABC broadcasts fairly represented the troupe's
brand of comedy. Many such members would thus be disinclined to
patronize the work of Monty Python in the future. This would
jeopardize the viability of the troupe. 52

47. Id. at 24.
48. Id at 19 n.3.
49. Id at 20.
50. Id at 21.
51. Id at 23. The court stated, "[C]opyright law should be used to recognize the
important role of the artist in our society and the need to encourage production and
dissemination of artistic works by providing adequate legal protection for one who
submits his work to the public." Id The court also stated, "[T]he law seeks to vindicate
the economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors." Id at 24.
52. Id at 19.
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Monty Python did not rest its claim to an injunction solely on its
economic argument; the troupe also maintained that the court should
grant the injunction on the basis of its artistic rights. 53 The troupe
argued that it had the moral right not to have its art deformed by
others. 54 The court of appeals agreed with Monty Python that ABC
had undermined the artistic integrity of the troupe's work by broadcasting the troupe's shows in an edited form. 55 The court also agreed that
ABC should be held liable for subverting Monty Python's artistic
integrity. 56 The theory upon which the court based this conclusion
differed significantly, however, from that proposed by Monty Python.
The court's theory was firmly rooted in economic analysis.
The Second Circuit upheld Monty Python's right to the artistic
integrity of its work not out of a desire to directly further artistic
integrity but on the basis of protecting Monty Python's market interests
in its shows. 57 Artists, such as the Monty Python troupe, the court
argued, have a market interest in pleasing their audience. Essentially,
the court's argument amounts to the following: The more audience
members there are who enjoy the artist's work, the more willing they
will be to pay for such enjoyment and the larger the audience will
become. Therefore, artists create their work, according to this argument,
in order to suit the tastes of their audience. Artists who cannot make
their work conform to the tastes of their audience will suffer financially ·
and, eventually, will be driven out of the art market. In this way, the
market encourages those artists with skill and insight capable of rousing
the public imagination to continue with their work and encourages the
rest to change careers.
Should a third party present the public with a distorted version of an
artist's work, the argument continues, that third party threatens the
economic well-being of the artist. This is so because the distortion, if
significant, undermines the artist's effort to create work that pleases her

53. Id at 23-24.
54. Id at 24. Monty Python's claim was one of moral right (droit moral), a right
recognized in civil-law countries.
55. Id at 25. The court stated, "We find that the truncated version at times
omitted the climax of the skits to which appellants' rare brand of humor was leading and
at other times deleted essential elements in the schematic development of a story line."
Id
56. Id
57. Id at 24. The court asserted, "[T]he economic incentive for artistic and
intellectual creation that serves as the foundation for American copyright law cannot be
reconciled with the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation
of their work to the public on which the artists are financially dependent." Id (citations
omitted).
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or his audience. 58 Being less pleased, the artist's audience will pay less
for the artist's work. The artist will thus suffer financially and will
produce less work. Such a result is economically inefficient: society
will be deprived of pleasing artwork. Therefore, in order to encourage
the production of quality artwork, the law ought to recognize an artist's
right to the artistic integrity of her or his work. 59
The court of appeals was not oblivious to the salutary consequences
that its economic analysis had on the vindication of the value of artistic
integrity. 60 In fact, it is possible that the court was motivated to
construct its economic argument in order to be able to vindicate this
value. This possibility can be inferred from the fact that the economic
argument was strained at best. After all, the creation of artwork is
dissimilar to the creation of widgets. Much of what is presently
considered "good" art was, at the time of its creation, considered poor
by the art market. 61 This is because talented artists often lead, rather
than follow, public taste. Thus, there is not necessarily a correlation
between a work's price on the market and its artistic value. Similarly,
the idea of tampering does not apply to artwork in the same way that it
applies to cars or drugs. The distortion of a piece of art may not lessen
its value, and, in some circumstances, may actually add value-aesthetically. 62
The court of appeals' decision to found Monty Python's property right
in its script on an inapposite economic analogy between artwork and
manufactured goods rather than on the value of artistic integrity calls for
an explanation. This Article suggests that the most cogent explanation
is that property rights are founded on market values. Courts award
property rights to a good when to do so enhances trade in that good.

58. Id The court noted, "[I]t is the writer or performer, rather than the network,
who suffers the consequences of the mutilation, for the public will have only the final
product by which to evaluate the work." Id.
59. Id Thus, the law considers the violation of artistic integrity as analogous to
unfair competition. The court stated, "This statute [Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § l 125(a)],
the federal counterpart to state unfair competition laws, has been invoked to prevent
misrepresentations that may injure plaintiffs business or personal reputation, even where
no registered trademark is concerned." Id
60. Id The court stated, "Although such decisions are clothed in terms of
proprietary right in one's creation, they also properly vindicate the author's personal right
to prevent the presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form." Id.
61. One need only think of the Impressionists as an illustration of this point.
62. Consider Andy Warhol's use of the artwork on the label of soup cans.
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D.

U.S. Steel: Protection of a Community

Gilliam illustrates how parties wishing to vindicate some non - market
values inhering in a good can manipulate property law discourse,
premised on purely economic considerations, to achieve their ends.
While these parties, and the courts they try to convince, must operate
within the confines of the goal of promoting trade, they can often
persuasively argue that granting them property rights achieves this goal.
It may be that parties make such arguments with a wink and a nod at
times,_ knowing full well that they are highly contrived, but at other
times, parties seem actually to believe their economic contentions.
Nevertheless, parties do not, where possible, attempt to directly found
their property claims on their non-market interests. 63
Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America v. United States Steel
Corp. 64 provides an example of a party that, in attempting to vindicate
the non-market value of community, could make no plausible economic
argument in favor of its claimed property right. The case involves the
decision by U.S. Steel to shut down two steel mills in Youngstown,
Ohio. The company's stated reason for shutting the plants down was
that they were obsolete and thus unprofitable. 65
The community of Youngstown was built around steel and, in
particular, around U.S. Steel. Because of steel there were jobs, there
were schools, there were roads, and there was expansion. 66 The fate
of the community was intimately tied to the future of U.S. Steel's two
mills. Given this situation, the company's decision to leave Youngstown
was likely to completely devastate the community. 67
In order to avoid the devastation of their community, the local steel
workers union, the local congressman, and the Attorney General of Ohio
commenced an action against U.S. Steel in an attempt to force the
company to keep the two mills operational and, in the alternative, to sell
63. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (dealing with the
right of a publicity interest in one's voice).
64. 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
65. Id at 1265.
66. As the trial judge observed:
Everything that has happened in the Mahoning Valley has been happening for
many years because of steel. Schools have been built, roads have been built.
Expansion that has taken place is because of steel. And to accommodate that
industry, lives and destinies of the inhabitants of that community were based
and planned on the basis of that institution: Steel.
Id
67. Id The court stated, "While we cannot read the future of Youngstown from
this record, what the record does indicate clearly is that we deal with an economic
tragedy of major proportion to Youngstown and Ohio's Mahoning Valley." Id
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the mills to the community. 68 U.S. Steel claimed that it had the
absolute right to make the business decision to shut down the plants.
When the union sought to negotiate for the purchase of the mills, U.S.
Steel refused, claiming that it feared the government would subsidize the
operation of the mills to the competitive detriment of the company. 69
At the pre-trial hearing, the court was extremely sympathetic to the
position taken by the union and the community. Following a full
hearing, however, the district judge found himself unable to accord the
union and community a property right in the mills. While he stated his
continued belief that U.S. Steel ought not to be permitted to devastate
the Youngstown community by closing the plants, 70 he held that there
was no authority upon which he could found a property right in the
community to prevent this from happening. 71
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in dealing with the appeal,
also expressed deep sympathy for the plight of the Youngstown
community. 72 The appeals court found itself in the same position,
however, as had the trial court: it could find no authority to support the
grant of a property right to the community. 73 The court therefore held
that it could offer the Youngstown community no assistance. In its

68. Id at 1265-66.
69. Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611,
617 (1988).
70. U.S. Steel, 631 F.2d at 1266. The trial judge stated, "United States Steel
should not be permitted to leave the Youngstown area devastated after drawing from the
lifeblood of the community for so many years." Id
71. Id The court stated, "Unfortunately, the mechanism to reach this ideal
settlement, to recognize this new property right, is not now in existence in the code of
laws of our nation." Id.
72. Id at 1280. The court stated, "This court has examined these allegations with
care and with great sympathy for the community interest reflected therein." Id
73. Like the district court, the court of appeals searched high and low for authority
on which to base a property right for the community:
Our problem in dealing with plaintiffs fourth cause of action is one of
authority. Neither in brief nor oral argument have plaintiffs pointed to any
constitutional provision contained in· either the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the State of Ohio, nor any law enacted by the
United States Congress or the Legislature of Ohio, nor any case decided by the
courts of either of these jurisdictions which would convey authority to this
court to require the United States Steel Corporation to continue operations in
Youngstown which its officers and Board of Directors had decided to
discontinue on the basis of unprofitability.
Id
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opinion, only the legislature could resolve all the policy issues sunrrounding the question of plant closings. 74
The U.S. Steel case is one in which strong non-market values
supported the recognition of a community property right in the mills
while market values militated against such a recognition. Without the
steel mills, Youngstown was in desperate shape. Not only were some
13,000 jobs lost as a result of the closings, 75 but the focus of the
community was lost. With a property right to the mills, the community
would have been able to force U.S. Steel to sell it the mills or, at least,
to help establish some other industry to take the place of the one
founded on steel. Without such a property right, the community was
unable to prevent the tragedy that befell it.
On the other hand, the goal of enhancing trade in goods, in this case
steel mills, is best ensured by withholding a property right from the
community. Trade in mills requires clear title. If workers or members
of the community can simply pick up a property interest in a plant by
working at the plant or living nearby, then title to the plant will be
uncertain. This will hurt trade in two ways. First, managers of a mill
will never know to whom they are responsible. As individuals in the
community amass proprietary interests in the mill, ownership in the mill
will become increasingly diluted. It will become unclear to management
from whom, among the mass of owners, they are to take instructions.
Second, prospective purchasers will be wary of buying the plant for fear
that the ostensible owners cannot actually convey full title. 76
Trade is enhanced by encouraging individuals to create goods. The
more goods that are created, the more there is to trade. Thus, trade is
enhanced when individuals build mills. Individuals will not build mills,
however, unless they know they will reap the financial rewards from
doing so. Property rights provide such individuals with the security that
they, to the exclusion of all others, will be able to profit from the mills
that they construct. If, however, the community can gain competing
property rights to mills, individuals will lose this security. They will
thus be less willing to invest in the construction of steel mills.
Individuals are also less likely to invest in a mill where they do not
control how their investment will be used. Individuals who risk their
capital want to ensure that this capital is used wisely. They therefore

74. Id. at 1282. "In the view of this court, formulation of public policy on the
great issues involved in plant closings and removals is clearly the responsibility of the
legislatures of the states or of the Congress of the United States." Id.
75. Singer, supra note 69, at 615 n.9.
76. Similarly, lenders may be wary of loaning money on the security of a plant,
the ownership of which is in doubt.
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wish to control the use to which their money is put. If others gain
property rights to one's mill, however, one not only must share the mill
itself but must also share control over its capital. This added risk
discourages investment.
The U.S. Steel case thus provides an example of a showdown between
community and market values. While the judges were emotionally
pulled toward vindicating community values above market values, once
engaged in property law discourse they opted to uphold market over
community values. The judges refused to grant a property right that
would have encouraged what they all acknowledged to be socially useful
conduct-the preservation of the Youngstown community-and agreed
to uphold a property right-that of U.S. Steel to the mills-that all
understood would lead to socially harmful conduct, the devastation of
Youngstown.
Confronted by the fact that it had only a non-economic argument
when property law appeared to require an economic one, the Youngstown community attempted to convince the court of appeals that it was
competent to consider non-market values in deciding whether to award
the community a property right in the mills. To this end, the community
relied on one sentence from the United States Supreme Court decision
in Munn v. Illinois: 77 "So, too, in matters which do affect the public
interest, and as to which legislative control may be exercised, ifthere are
no statutory regulations upon the subject, the courts must determine what
is reasonable." 78 In that case, the Illinois Legislature set minimum
grain storage charges in Chicago and other large cities in the state. The
Munn Court made the quoted statement in the course of affirming the
state's authority to impose such minimum charges. The Youngstown
community argued that, given the lack of legislative guidance in the area
of community ownership of manufacturing plants, the court had to
consider all values inhering in the mills, not simply market values,
before making its determination. 79
The U.S. Steel court rejected Youngstown's argument that courts were
competent to address non-economic as well as economic arguments in
deciding property law cases. The court held that the Munn statement

77. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
78. US. Steel, 631 F.2d at 1281-82 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134
(1877).
79. Id
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provided an insufficient basis for the court to order U.S. Steel to
continue the operation of the two mills despite their unprofitability. 80
The court noted that the United States had faced a long history of plant
shut-downs. Determining how to respond to such shut-downs, the court
held, implicated a great number of policy questions that courts are
institutionally incompetent to consider. 81 For this reason, it refused to
consider Youngstown's claim that it needed a property right in the mills
in order to uphold the value of community. 82
As the Chakrabarty, Gilliam, and U.S. Steel cases illustrate, property
discourse in American courts focuses exclusively on market values.
Parties who cannot explain in economic terms why the court ought to
grant property rights will not be granted such rights. Parties who cannot
found their opposition to the grant of property rights on market
principles will fail to block the allocation of such rights. Because of
their assumption that a good's market price is epiphenomena! of all the
various ways in which people value that good, courts remain confident
that their property analysis vindicates all values inhering in a particular
good. The cases discussed above suggest that such confidence may be
misplaced. The ramifications of this potentially ill-founded confidence
may become especially apparent in the area of human biotechnology-an
area where so many non-market values are implicated.
II.

VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE BODY AND HUMAN HEALTH

The way each of us values the goods around us is complex, occasionally counter-intuitive, and often conflicting. We may value goods both
instrumentally-as a means of transportation, as a source of nutrients, or
as a way to stay warm-and intrinsically-as a symbol of community,
competition, or power.
According to Charles Taylor, we make determinations within a moral
landscape, or "framework," the features of which are the values that we
hold. 83 How we place ourselves within that landscape and how we
orient ourselves with respect to those values define, in large part, who

80. Id. at 1282. "We find no ground to extend it to assert judicial power to order
a steel manufacturing corporation to continue the operation of two plants which it (and
a District Court on competent evidence) have found to be unprofitable." Id.
81. Id.
82. Recall that the Court in Chakrabarty similarly relied on this judicial
incompetency argument to avoid consideration of non-economic values (in that case,
environmental safety and human health). Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317
(1980).
83. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
IDENTITY 26 (1989). Taylor stated, "Frameworks provide the background, explicit or
implicit, for our moral judgments, intuitions, or reactions ...." Id.
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we are. 84 In this landscape, some features appear more prominent or
closer to us than do others: these are the values that are most important
or most implicated in the decision before us. When we interact with a
good-when we make a decision about that good-we do so within the
framework of this landscape. This Part begins the task-one that will
not be completed-of setting out some of the more prominent features
in the moral landscape relating to the human body and human health.
The concept of individual frameworks implies that frameworks vary
not only from person to person within a given culture-a culture based
on shared beliefs and values-but even more so between cultures.
Therefore, it is not claimed that those features of the moral landscape
relating to the human body and human health that are laid out apply to
all people or cultures equally. 85 This analysis, therefore, is restricted
to contemporary American society.
A.
1.

The Human Body

The Body and Its Values

The human body reflects the society in which it exists. Social
customs and institutions shape or mark the body directly, for example,
through hairstyle, the piercing of ears, make-up, and the removal of
facial hair. Customs and institutions also shape or mark the body
indirectly, for example, through posture, facial expression, intonation,
and scent. The body, according to Michel Foucault, 86 is not so much
refined as it is molded by social institutions such as the family, the
school, the church, the workplace, and the community. According to
this view, one cannot fully describe the human body apart from the
society in which it exists. 87 In trying to understand the signification of

84. Id at 27-28. "[Those suffering from an 'identity crisis'] lack a frame or
horizon within which things can take on a stable significance, within which some life
possibilities can be seen as good or meaningful, others as bad or trivial." Id.
85. However, the author believes that at some level most apply to all cultures.
86. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975).
87. Nancy Fraser, Foucault's Body-Language: A Post-Humanist Political
Rhetoric?, 61 SALMAGUNDI 55, 64 (1983); see also JANA SAWICKI, DISCIPLINING
FOUCAULT: FEMINISM, POWER, AND THE BODY 80 (1991).
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the human body-what we understand the body and its components to
mean-one must analyze the body within the context of a given society.

2.

The Body and Politics

In Western societies, the human body has taken on various meanings
within the political realm. The body of the Middle Ages was an organic
whole reflecting both the cosmological88 and the political89 orders.
This body was harmonious, proportional, monumental, and male. 90
The metaphorical use of the body symbolized the hierarchy within
society: the head representing Christ, the eyes symbolizing the Church,
the chest and arms denoting lay power, and the lower limbs and
extremities corresponding to the masses. 91
In the modem era, this organic view of the body gave way to a
mechanical understanding of the body. No longer was the body a sacred
incarnation of cosmological truth; rather, it was a worldly machine that
could be made transparent through technology. 92 The modern body
was an isolated unit no longer connected to the cosmos. Within the
body, each organ performed its function in isolation. The then-current
understanding of the body was therefore a reductionist one. With
increasing knowledge, this reduction went further, from organ, to cell,
to gene.
This change of perspective led to the view that society was not a
single body, but was composed of separate bodies whose relationship to
one another was contingent. 93 The life of the individual, and no longer
the life of the body politic, was paramount. The laborer, who had
previously been metaphorically understood as the legs of the body
politic, became an individual body like every other individual body in

88. David M. Levin & George F. Solomon, The Discursive Formation ofthe Body
in the History of Medicine, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 515, 523 (1990). See Mark Kidel &
Susan Rowe-Leete, Mapping the Body, in 3 FRAGMENTS FOR A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN
BODY 448, 465-66 (Michel Feher et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter FRAGMENTS] for a
pictorial illustration of the link between the body and the cosmos.
89. Jacques Le Goff, Head or Heart? The Political Use of Body Metaphors in the
Middle Ages, in FRAGMENTS, supra note 88, at 13; Randall McGowen, The Body and
Punishment in Eighteenth-Century England, 59 J. Moo. HIST. 651, 654 (1987).
90. Laurie Finke, Mystical Bodies and the Dialogics of Vision, 67 PHILOLOGICAL
Q. 439, 444 (1988). Women and other marginal groups were thought to be grotesque
forms of this classic body. Id.
91. Le Goff, supra note 89, at 16-17.
92. Levin & Solomon, supra note 88, at 519.
93. McGowen, supra note 89, at 670.
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society. 94 The fact that each of us is embodied in similar bodies led to
the replacement of a hierarchy of people with an equality of bodies.
3.

The Body, Culture, and Self-Definition

Culture, like the political sphere of human life, imprints itself upon the
body. Culture directly marks the body through posture, walking, gait,
accent, and facial expressions. For example, British children are said to
learn to hold their eyebrows in a raised position during their first few
months of life. 95 Such cultural marks on the body forever associate the
individual with the culture of his or her birth or development. In a
similar manner, one's status within society is marked upon the body.
Not only Eliza Doolittle's accent, but her posture and manner of
walking, had to be altered so that she could pass as an aristocrat. Caste
marks, clothing, and hair styles also display the wearer's place and status
within society.
Just as the body is a symbol of cultural boundary, it is also a symbol
of the boundary between individuals. Our bodies help to delineate the
"me" from the surrounding universe. The infant's discovery of itself
occurs, according to Jacques Lacan, at the moment the infant recognizes
its body in a mirror. 96 When an infant reaches the "mirror stage," he
or she for the first time understands that the image in the mirror is him
or herself. At this instant, the infant becomes a subjective being. That
is, by recognizing its body as its self, the infant becomes a subject, a
human individual. And by associating its own body with "me," the
infant comes to recognize the existence of others; for the only way to
recognize itself as a distinct entity is for the infant to differentiate its
body, and hence itself, from others. 97
What is within the boundary of the self is very different from what is
outside of this boundary. For example, there is an immense difference
between saliva in our mouths and saliva we have spit out. While we
would unhesitatingly swallow the former, we are generally loathe to

94. Pasi Falk, Corporealityand Its Fates in History, 28 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 115,
122 (1985).
95. ELAINE SCARRY, The BODY IN PAIN: The MAKING AND UNMAKING OF The
WORLD 109 (1985).
96. See the discussionofLacan' s mirror stage in CATHERINE CLEMENT, The LIVES
AND LEGENDS OF JACQUES LACAN 84-92 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1983).
97. JULIET MITCHELL, PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND FEMINISM 384-86 (1975).

1189

swallow the latter. 98 Moreover, the boundary between what is "us" and
what is not is far from clear and does not necessarily depend on the
contours of our material body. Consider, for example, seating arrangements on a subway car, bus, or train. People seem to naturally space
themselves out over the seats, each respecting the "space" around the
others. We generally consider it rude to sit close to another person
when there is open seating available. On the other hand, when a subway
car is crowded, one feels little discomfort when someone not only sits
near to one but actually touches one's body.
Further, the boundary between what is us and what is outside need not
correspond with the outside of the physical body. When an arm or leg
is amputated, amputees often still consider the lost limb as part of
themselves. Thus, a pyrophobic patient may become truly fearful when
the amputated limb is cremated. 99 The boundary between us and the
surrounding world can even occur within the body proper. For example,
Dr. Oliver Sacks describes a patient who failed to recognize his own leg
as part of himself. 100
The body is implicated far beyond this first differentiation of the "me"
from the "they." It helps to shape each individual's understanding of her
or himself and her or his place within society. For example, Hegel
suggests that the will is alive in the body and this state of being is the
pre-condition for every mode of existence, 101 from the individual, to
the family, to society, to the state, and, ultimately, to world history. The
human body is thus intrinsically valuable as the paradigmatic expression
of the will in the external sphere. It is also instrumentally valuable as
the pre-condition to every mode of existence. Each individual values
her or his body as the embodiment of freedom and as the vehicle
through which she or he senses the external world. 102 To others, the
body of a person is what they recognize as that person. 103
Alternatively, drawing on the learning of Michel Foucault, we in this
society value human bodies as the site of the development of the "self."
The body is the raw material for social forces that act upon it to form

98. DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 414 (1991).
99. See Browning v. Norton-Children's Hosp., 504 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1974).
100. OLIVER SACKS, The Man Who Fell Out of Bed, in The MAN WHO MISTOOK
HIS WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER CLINICAL TALES 55 (1987).
IOI. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 1 47 (T.M. Knox trans., 1967)
(1821). (As the Philosophy of Right is divided into paragraphs, remarks to paragraphs,
and additions to paragraphs, "¶"followed by a number will refer to paragraph numbers,
and "1" followed by a number and an "R" will refer to the remarks found beneath the
paragraph indicated by the number.)
102. Id 1 48R.
103. Id
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both our conceptions of the body and of the soul. 104 In this view, the
body is socially created, shaped by power and knowledge relations. In
contradistinction to the Hegelian framework, the body is not valued as
the embodiment of the soul's freedom, but is seen as the prisoner of the
soul. 105
4.

The Body and Ritual

The body figures prominently in solemnization rituals. 106 Marriage,
for example, was traditionally consummated by sexual intercourse. In
this way, the married couple was thought to become one flesh. 107 In
the Old Testament important vows are formalized by placing the hand
under the thigh. 108 Contemporary Western society continues to rely on
body symbolism to formalize its rituals. Handshakes seal a deal 109 and
a person who is telling the truth looks the listener in the eye.
Less formal initiation rituals greet newborns in Western and other
societies. Parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and friends each examine
the newborn to determine whether the infant's nose more closely
resembles that of the father or the mother, whether the baby has the
grandfather's or grandmother's eyes, or whether the child's smile takes
after one side of the family or the other. In this way, the physical
characteristics of the child link him or her to past generations and situate
the infant within a larger social group.
Funerals represent another important ceremony that centers on the
body. By honoring the deceased's body, we pay homage to the
deceased. Thus, we construct tombs to house the corpses of our great
leaders, from kings and queens to Napoleon and Lenin. We also
preserve parts of the deceased's body as relics.
Relics from the bodies of saints have been particularly venerated.
Umbrian peasants, around the year 1000, are recorded to have wished to

104. FOUCAULT, supra note 86, at 25-30.
105. Id at 30.
106. The author is indebted to William Miller for drawing his attention to this use
of the body.
107. Genesis 2:24.
108. See Genesis 24:9:
So the servant put his hand under the thigh of Abraham his master, and swore
to him concerning this matter.
109. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
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kill Saint Romuald in order to make sure his bones would not be
lost. 110 At the death of Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Fossanuova monks
decapitated, boiled, and preserved the saint's body. While Saint
Elizabeth of Hungary was lying in state in 1231, worshippers cut off
parts of her body to preserve them as relics. Similarly, at the funeral of
the Ayatollah Khomeini, some of the faithful tore at his body in order
to possess a relic. 111
This tradition of collecting relics from the dead continues in Western
culture, albeit in a different form. Instead of preserving a finger or
some hair from the deceased, we now collect photographs. Photographs,
being a representation of the body of the deceased, more than letters or
drawings, serve the same purpose as did relics in the past: they help us
remember and honor our ancestors. Whether we look at them often or
infrequently, photographs are among our most precious treasures. This
is perhaps why, for example, following the death of a loved one, it is
not uncommon for a family to lovingly peruse the deceased's collection
of photographs and to distribute them equitably among family members.
Rituals of sharing also involve the body. In his expansion upon an
argument credited to Richard Titmuss, 112 Thomas Murray argues that
gifts of the body-for example, blood and kidneys-to strangers affirm
the "quintessentially human" 113 gift of solidarity. "Blood represents
individual life and vitality, and at the same time it signifies the oldest,
most primitive tie that affirms solidarity and binds people to one
another. " 114

5.

The Sacred Body and the Profane Body

Perhaps the area in which the human body has its richest symbolism
is in connection with that which is sacred and that which is profane.
The human body is an earthly reflection of the divine: according to
Western religions, our bodies are made in the image of God. 115 At the

110. This and the following two examples are discussed in J. HUIZINGA, The
WANING OF THE MIDDLE AGES 150 (1954).
111. John Kifner, Amid Frenzy, Iranians Bury The Ayatollah, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
1989, at Al.
112. RICHARD M. Titmuss, the GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO
SOCIAL POLICY (1971).
113. Thomas H. Murray, Gifts of the Body and the Needs of Strangers, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Apr. 1987, at 30, 36.
114. Id.
115. Genesisl:27:
So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him;
male and female he created them.
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same time, the body symbolizes the profane. For example, giving in to
one's "fleshly" desires or one's appetites is often considered a sin.
Blood is accorded a sacred place among the body's components and
is associated with life itself. When God bade Noah to be fruitful and
multiply and to eat every living thing, God forbade the consumption of
blood. "Only you shall not eat flesh with its life, that is, its blood. For
your lifeblood I will surely require a reckoning; of every beast I will
require it and of man." 116 Blood has been granted the ability to speak
for the deceased after death. Thus, Abel's blood spoke to God with
news of his murder. 117 In medieval northern Albania, a bottle of a
victim's blood was watched by kin to see if it "boiled," or fermented.
If the blood did boil, vengeance was immediately taken; otherwise,
compensation for the death was accepted. 118
Parallel to the body's representation of the sacred, it symbolizes the
profane. In Christian belief, the body signifies both sin and dirt. Thus,
to remove the taint of original sin, the body must be ritually bathed in
baptism. The metaphorical link between sin and dirt is continued
through the foot washing ceremony. Once cleansed (baptized) of dirt
(sin), the body (soul) need only be cleansed where it touches the earth
(vice). Thus, Jesus taught that "[h]e who has bathed does not need to
wash except for his feet, but he is clean all over." 119
The female body, in particular, has been associated with the profane.
In Western culture, women have been variously labelled as sexually
insatiable, 120 imperfect, 121 and grotesque. 122 The belief in the profanity of the female· body has worked itself into beliefs concerning
conception. According to one such belief, while the female body was
given credit for the formation of the material parts of the fetus, the male
body was thought to contribute the more important form or essence of

116. Genesis 9:4-5; see also Deuteronomy 12:16.
117. Genesis4:10:
And the LORD said, "What have you done? The voice of your brother's blood
is crying to me from the ground."
118. William I. Miller, Choosing the Avenger: Some Aspects of the Bloodfeud in
Medieval Iceland and England, 1 L. & HIST. REV. 159, 182 n.92 (1983).
119. John.13:10.
120. loan P. Culianu, A Corpus for the Body, 63 J. Mod. HIST. 61, 71 (1991).
121. Giulia Sissa, Subtle Bodies, in FRAGMENTS, supra note 88, at 136. Aristotle
thought that the birth of a female child demonstrated some infirmity in the father. Id.
122. Finke, supra note 90, at 444.
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the child. 123 This dichotomy between idea and matter is well illustrated in the story of Jesus's conception. Jesus was conceived through the
ethereal contribution of the Holy Spirit and the material contribution of
Mary. 124 The profanity of the female body was somewhat alleviated
in this case because Mary was a virgin, the least profane of female
bodies.
Sin itself has been thought to mark the body. Red hair has been
associated with the presence of the devil while green eyes are said to be
a sign of jealousy. To punish Eve for eating the apple from the tree of
knowledge, God inflicted the pain of childbirth upon women's bodies.125 Similarly, Cain's body was marked by God as a sign of Cain's
guilt and a sign that none should kill him. 126 The belief that sin marks
the body is tragically demonstrated today by those who preach that
AIDS is a punishment from God for immoral sexual conduct. 127
The profane nature of the human body, however, is not always
condemned. In fact, through clothing, make-up, and hairstyles, the
sexuality of the body, principally the female body, is heightened. Highheeled shoes, for example, emphasize hip movement and cause both
buttocks and chest to protrude. 128 Similarly, cosmetics accentuate the
eyes, increasing sexual attractiveness. 129 To a lesser extent, men's
clothing also enhances sexual appeal: shoulder pads enhance the
appearance of upper body strength while neckties serve as phallic
symbols.
The symbolism of the human body, as this cursory examination shows,
is rich and varied within Western culture. The body signifies the
relation between individual and world, individual and state, and the
sacred and the profane. While some have argued that there is no a priori
reason for according the body a prominent position in our understanding
of ourselves and our world, 130 it appears to be a contingent truth that

123. Sissa, supra note 121, at 139-40.
124. Luke 1:26-41.
125. Genesis 3:16.
126. Genesis4:15.
127. See, e.g., Peter Steinfels, AIDS Provokes Theological Second Thoughts, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1989, § 4, at 5 (referring to the publicly professed position of the
American Council of Christian Churches); Edward Tivnan, Homosexuals and the
Churches,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 84 (referring to the Archbishop
of Philadelphia's statement that "[t]he spread of AIDS is an act of vengeance against the
sin of homosexuality").
128 Culianu, supra note 120, at 78.
129. Id at 79.
130. See Thomas H. Murray, On the Human Body as Property: The Meaning of
Embodiment, Markets, and the Meaning of Strangers, 20 J.L. REFORM I 055, 1064-68
(1987) (discussing the views of Joseph Fletcher and H. Tristam Engelhardt).
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every human culture invests the body with deep symbolic meaning. Our
bodies symbolically link us to our ancestors, our community, and our
children. Our understanding of our own identity is profoundly
influenced by our bodies and the meanings we attach to them.

B.

Human Health

The ways we value human health overlap, for obvious reasons, with
the ways we value the human body. Because health describes a state of
the body (although a highly ambiguous, and as discussed below,
culturally contingent one), many of the values identified above in the
discussion of the body apply to human health. Nonetheless, health and
the body are distinct goods. Health relates not only to the physical
body, but to the mind; it denotes not so much the ideal of a perfect body
but the state of a relative lack of illness. Unlike the body, health cannot
be seen, although it may be perceived. It is described not by what it is,
but by what it is not-the absence of illness, suffering, and pain.

1.

Health and Politics

Health is both a metaphor for politics and a metaphor used in politics
to justify or support certain actions. We say that one of the goals of
politics is to "heal" rifts between communities. Racial intolerance,
spousal assault, and other social "ills" are "open sores" in our society.
Poverty and homelessness are said to be "epidemic."
We not only use the analogy between health and politics to give color
to our description of politics, but we apply our understanding of health
in order to understand politics. Politicians ask us "to take our medicine"
in order to bring the economy back to "health." In the eighteenth
century, capital punishment was seen as a "cure" for illness in the body
politic. 131 Those who stole or murdered endangered the life of the
body politic to the same extent as a gangrenous limb threatened the life
of the human body. The remedy, in both cases, was amputation. 132
Judges pronouncing sentences. of death were, therefore, in the same

131.
132.

McGowen, supra note 89.
Id at 661.
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position as physicians amputating legs: both were healing the sickness
of the body. 133
The analogy between health and politics is also apparent in literature.
Albert Camus in his book, The Plague, 134 uses a fictional plague
devastating a French city as a metaphor for the Nazi occupation of
France during World War ll. 135 By viewing the Nazi occupation as a
plague, Camus explored the political and bureaucratic reasons behind
France's sudden fall to Germany, 136 the lack of hope that Germany
could be defeated, 137 and the evolution, in the inhuman face of Nazism, of the Resistance into a militaristic and cut-throat force. 138 The
analogy between a plague and Nazism works, in large part, because of
the analogy between political community and the body: just as the
human body may sometimes become ill and require unpleasant and
painful medical attention, so too the body politic may occasionally
become ill and require harsh and painful treatment in the hands of
community leaders.
The Nazis themselves used the analogy between health and politics to
further their program of genocide. The Nazis portrayed Jews, Slavs, and
Gypsies as "racial parasites" who represented a health threat to Germany
because their genes would weaken the Aryan gene pool. 139 The
medical analogy carried through to the death camps. The process of
selection for those who would be sent to the gas chambers resembled

133. Id at 664.
134. ALBERT CAMUS, LA PESTE (1947).
135. Allen Thiher, Teaching the Historical Context o/The Plague, in APPROACHES
TO TEACHING CAMUS'S THE PLAGUE 90, 96 (Steven G. Kellman ed., 1985):
The Plague is perhaps most clearly referential in the way it documents the
details of how daily life goes on in the face of an occupying army. The
rationing of food, the hedonistic drinking, the reruns of films in the cinemas,
the hoarding of scarce goods and the organizing of a black market, the closing
of shops left abandoned by the "departed," the imposing of curfews, the
creation of "isolation camps" for mass internments, the inordinate demands
made on one's physical stamina-these and many other details offer exact
parallels with life during the Occupation.
Id
136. Id at 95.
137. Id at 97.
138. Id Thiher stated, "The Resistance offers, then, a primary lesson in how the
need to destroy the inhuman has a diabolical capacity to convert virtuous persons into
the inhuman themselves--out of virtuous necessity." Id
139. Alfons Labisch, The Social Construction ofHealth: From Early Modern Times
to the Beginnings of the Industrialization, in THE SOCIAL CONS1RUCTION OF ILLNESS
85, 97-98 (Jens Lachmund & Gunnar Stollberg eds., 1992); JOEL RICHMAN, MEDICINE
AND HEALTH 10 (1987).
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medical triage: inmates undressed in "medical blocks" and were used
for medical "experimentation." 140
Another connection between health and politics is the notion that good
citizenship requires that we keep ourselves in good health. This
connection is currently illustrated in debates surrounding smoking, the
wearing of seat-belts in automobiles, and the wearing of bicycle helmets.
Plato understood health to be a sound pattern of living and thought that
those who became ill, other than by reason of epidemic, had been
morally irresponsible. 141
Health practitioners, while occupying a position of moral neutrality-they do not usually tell us what is morally right or wrong-dispense
morally loaded diagnoses by labelling certain pains and certain
conditions as illness while refusing to recognize others as such. 142
This is a double-edged sword. If one's behavior is labelled "illness,"
whether it be homosexuality or stress from an unsatisfying occupation,
then many members of society, if not most, will view the behavior as a
personal inconvenience or tragedy and not as a political statement. If
one's behavior is not labelled "illness"-for example, if a physician says
that a loved one did not kill him or herself because of a mental disability

140. RICHMAN, supra note 139, at 10-11.
141. Julius Moravcsik, Ancient and Modern Conceptions of Health and Medicine,
1 J. MED. & PHIL. 337, 342 (1976).
142.
lvAN ILLICH, LIMITS TO MEDICINE 54 (1976). The author states,
The physician decides what is a symptom and who is sick. He [or she] is a
moral entrepreneur, charged with inquisitorial powers to discover certain
wrongs to be righted. Medicine, like all crusades, creates a new group of
outsiders each time it makes a new diagnosis stick. Morality is as implicit in
sickness as it is in crime or in sin.
Id. Masturbation and menopause offer two examples of conditions that have been
transformed from the realm of the normal to the realm of the diseased or vice versa. A
hundred years ago, physicians wrote of masturbation as an illness leading to general
debility that was cured by calming the nerves, hard work, tonics, sedatives, narcotics,
restraining devices, circumcision (of males and females), and other intrusive procedures.
PETER E.S. FREUND & MEREDITH B. MCGUIRE, HEALTH, ILLNESS, AND THE SOCIAL
BODY: A CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY 206-07 (1991). Masturbation is no longer viewed as
a disease and, in fact, is considered to be normal. Id. at 207. Menopause was, up to the
last half century, understood as simply a normal part of aging. Id. at 209. Today,
however, it is a deficiency disease that is treatable through estrogen supplements. Id. at
210.
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and thus committed "suicide" rather than died of an illness-one may be
subjected to social sanction. 143
Physicians also exercise social control by discovering the cause, or
etiology, of disease. The cause of disease is located within the patient's
body rather than in environmental, occupational, social, or political
circumstances. 144 Thus, instead of working to reduce occupational
hazards, we counsel those who possess a susceptibility to particular
illnesses to seek another job. 145 By looking at the patient's body to
discover the etiology of disease, health care professionals place
responsibility for disease on the patient. Individuals choose to take
health risks, accept hazardous jobs, and live near polluted water. The
social or environmental conditions leading to disease are not to
blame. 146 By focusing on the individual rather than on the social,
environmental, and political surroundings of the individual, medicine
misses much. As Freund & McGuire stated: "Instead of examining the
work conditions that create stress, attention is focused on how adequately the individual responds to stress. Instead of looking at the marital,
family, or work pressures of a compulsive overeater or smoker, emphasis
is placed upon the individual's will power to control personal behavior."147
A third way that physicians exert social control is through the
physician-patient relationship. A patient visiting a physician not only
lacks the physician's expertise, but is anxious about the result of the
encounter. 148 Physicians control the flow of information both from the
patient to the physician-through an interview process-and from the

143. ILLICH, supra note 142, at 54; see discussion infra notes 296-97 and
accompanying text.
144. FREUND & McGUIRE, supra note 142, at 6-7, 217-18.
145. Id. at 217-18. Consider the following statement about susceptibility to cancer:
"Recent research shows cancer is not primarily caused by poisons spewed out by
uncaring industry. Rather, the villain appears to be an individual's own genetic
susceptibilities." Genetic Signposts on the Road to Cancer, GLOBE & MAIL, June 11,
1994, at D8. See also ILLICH, supra note 142, at 51:
[Medicine] serves to legitimize social arrangements into which many people
do not fit. It labels the handicapped as unfit and breeds ever new categories
of patients. People who are angered, sickened, and impaired by their industrial
labour and leisure can escape only into a life under medical supervision and
are thereby seduced or disqualified from political struggle for a healthier
world.
146. FREUND & McGUIRE, supra note 142, at 218.
147. Id. Alternatively, we find the cause for the individual's obesity in her or his
genes. See Stephen Strauss, Research Team Pinpoints Gene that Causes Obesity, GLOBE
& MAIL, Dec. 1, 1994, at Al.
148. FREUND & MCGUIRE, supra note 142, at 232; IRVING K. ZOLA, SOCIOMEDICAL INQUIRIES 219 (1983).
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physician to the patient. 149 The nature of physical examinations may
lead the patient to feel awkward, if not embarrassed. 150 Physicians
concentrate on the efficient use of their time and try to avoid spending
time with patients who they perceive to be contributing to their own
illness by their lifestyle or their failure to accept treatment. 151 Physicians adopt a scientific approach to disease in which the causes of
disease can be rationally explained. 152 Thus, emotional or social
aspects of a patient's illness are generally not of concern to the
physician. 153 By adopting a scientific, rather than sociological,
approach to disease, physicians tend to rely more on technology than on
counselling or other non-intrusive measures and express a concomitant
concern for elongating life rather than improving quality of life. 154

2.

Health and Culture

What we understand to be health and our obligation to be healthy is
dependent on our self-understanding. The understanding of what it is to
be healthy varies from culture to culture. 155 Thus, being in a particular
state may be labelled "ill" by members of one ethnic group and not ill
by members of another group, or by the same group at another time.
Our language reflects this change of labels. Where once a person was
considered "disabled" by a condition, whether physical or mental, and
unable to function in society, that person is now referred to as "challenged" by the condition. 156
Most health care is provided by non-professionals in non-institutional
settings. We self-administer dietary restrictions and medicine and curtail
certain activity to stave off or treat illness. 157 Other than self-care,

149. FREUND & McGUIRE, supra note 142, at 233-34.
150. ZOLA, supra note 148, at 220.
151. FREUND & McGUIRE, supra note 142, at 240, 243-44.
152. Id. at 221, 225.
153. Id. at 245. The authors stated, "[D]octors are socialized to view the
nonbiophysical aspects [of disease] as 'fuzzy,' 'soft' facts that are ultimately irrelevant
to their essential task." Id.
154. Id. at 255.
155. RICHMAN, supra note 139, at 20-21; ZOLA, supra note 148, at 86-108; ILLICH,
supra note 142, at 134; Meredith B. McGuire, Health and Spirituality as Contemporary
Concerns, 527 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 144, 146 (1993); MARGARET
READ, CULTURE, HEALTH, AND DISEASE 24 (1966).
156. See, e.g., WILL WRIGHT, THE SOCIAL LOGIC OF HEALTH 112-13 (1982).
157. FREUND & McGUIRE, supra note 142, at 185.
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family members and friends provide the bulk of health care services,
such as providing food, changing dressings, administering medication,
and monitoring symptoms. 158 The decision to pass on a condition to
a health care professional depends on various factors. These factors
include: whether we consider the condition abnormal or simply the
result of a hectic life, whether we believe the condition to be caused by
non-physical factors, such as emotions or spirits, and the social
expectation of how to deal with the condition. 159
The way in which a society determines how to deliver health services
to its members also points to the role that the values of community and
sharing play within that society. 160 Where health services are granted
to individuals as a right of citizenship, health is understood, at least in
part, as the concern of the community rather than of the individual. On
the other hand, where, as in the United States, no universal health
coverage is available, the value of individualism is paramount.
3.

Health, Spirituality, and Religion

Religious salvation also has strong metaphorical links to health and
healing. "Salvation is basically and essentially healing, the re-establishment of a whole that was broken, disrupted, disintegrated." 161 Jesus's
ability to heal the blind, the lame, and the lepers supported the claim
that he was the Messiah. 162 Other myths similarly link salvation with
bodily and cosmic health. 163
The correspondence between grace and health on the one hand and
between sin and illness on the other runs throughout Western history.
In the Middle Ages, health represented the certainty of grace while
illness was thought to be a punishment or ordeal. 164 Later, poor teeth
were thought to be a sign of sexual guilt. 165 In the last century,

158. Id.
159. Id. at 182-83.
160. See WALZER, supra note 11, at 90.
161. Paul Tillich, The Relation of Religion and Health: Historical Considerations
and Theoretical Questions, in THE MEANING OF HEALITH16, 17 (Perry Lefevre ed.,
1984).
162. Id. at 19; Matthew 11 :5.
163. Tillich, supra note 161, at 18-19.
164. Labisch, supra note 139, at 86; Patrick Gallacher, The Summoner's Tale and
Medieval Attitudes Towards Sickness, 21 CHAUCER REV. 200, 208 (1986).
165. David Kunzie, The Art of Pulling Teeth in the Seventeenth and Nineteenth
Centuries: From Public Martyrdom to Private Nightmare and Political Struggle, in 3
FRAGMENTS, supra note 88, at 28, 29.
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masturbation was both a sin and a cause of disease. 166 In literature,
Dorian Gray's numerous sins marked his portrait as sores and scars. 167
Many modem religious sects rely on their own understanding of health
to both differentiate themselves from the rest of society and to exert
control over their membership. 168 Alternatively, individuals have
turned to an eclectic mixture of health and religious practices, such as
meditation, healing circles, and Western occult traditions, in an effort to
reconnect their minds, bodies, and spirits. 169 Rather than view one's
health as the purely technical problem of identifying certain conditions
and administering certain medicines, these individuals see a link between
physical health, emotional health, spiritual health, and well-being that
modem medicine seems to ignore. 170 This view is supported by the
feeling that physicians treat patients as objects 171 with no say in their
medical treatment and that physicians look too narrowly at the body for
the sources of illness. 172
Despite the obvious links between the human body and human health,
each reflects its own distinct set of values. While the body reflects the
values of identity, community, sharing, and sin, human health is
connected to the values of individual responsibility and political and
moral control. Many of the issues involved in the question of the
ownership of human biological materials implicate both sets of values.
Thus, whenever we make determinations about these materials, whether
we are conscious of it or not, we decide which of these values to further
and which to ignore.
III.

MOORE:

THE PATIENT'S BODY

While there have been relatively few court decisions touching on the
admixture of property law and the human body, one case, Moore v.
Regents of the University of California, 173 provides a vehicle to discuss

166.
167.
(1895).
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
U.S. 936

See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DoRIAN GRAY {Modern Library, 1992)
See McGuire, supra note 155, at 151-52.
See id at 145, 148-49.
See id at 154.
FREUND & McGUIRE, supra note 142, at 217.
Id at 6-7.
51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990), cert. denied, 499
(1991). The facts as outlined in the text are set out in Moore. Id at 125-28,
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the effect of using property law to regulate biotechnological research in
the human body. In 1976, John Moore sought treatment at the Medical
Center of the University of California, Los Angeles, for hairy-cell
leukemia, a rare disease. Dr. David Golde, the attending physician,
confirmed the diagnosis and recommended that Moore's spleen be
removed. Moore consented to the splenectomy, which was subsequently
performed. On several occasions over the next seven years, at Golde's
direction, Moore returned to the medical center. 174 During these visits,
Golde withdrew samples of Moore's blood, skin, bone marrow, and
sperm. Golde told Moore that these samples were required to monitor
and ensure Moore's continued health.
Soon after his first encounters with Moore, however, Golde recognized
that Moore's body was overproducing certain important components of
the human immune system, known as lymphokines. Golde perceived
that the overproduction of these typically scarce substances made their
isolation possible. Moore's cells, he realized, could be used as factories
to produce lymphokines in large quantities, offering the opportunity for
commercial exploitation. 175 In order to capitalize on this idea, Golde
arranged before the splenectomy to have portions of Moore's spleen
retained for research. Golde used this spleen tissue and the additional
bodily substances collected from Moore during his subsequent visits to
the medical center to create a culture of cells producing lymphokines.
This "cell-line" differed from Moore's ordinary cells only in that,
through a well-known but sometimes difficult process, 176 the cells in
the cell-line were enabled to reproduce themselves indefinitely.
Realizing the enormous commercial potential of the cell-line and its
derived products-estimated to be approximately three billion dollars177-Golde and his research assistant, Shirley Quan, entered into
contracts with several pharmaceutical companies and the University of
California to commercially develop the cell-line. Pursuant to these
contracts, Golde received a substantial number of shares in one of the
companies and both Golde and the university were generously paid.
Golde and Quan applied for and obtained a patent in the cell-line and its
derived products which they assigned to the university.

793 P.2d at 480-83, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 147-50.
174. Moore did so at his own expense.
175. See OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 3, at 35.
176. Id at 32-34.
177. This estimate, based on the value of the cell-line and other products to the year
1990, was provided by Moore in his complaint. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 127, 793 P.2d at
482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
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Golde never informed Moore that the spleen and other cells were
commercially valuable nor that Golde intended to exploit this value for
himself. When Moore discovered Golde's activity, he brought suit
claiming that Golde, Quan, the university, and the pharmaceutical
companies had converted his cells and ought to disgorge the profit made
from the cell-line. Moore's claim was rejected on a preliminary motion
at trial. On appeal, however, the California Court of Appeal found that
Moore had retained a proprietary interest in his cells and that Moore was
entitled to compensation for conversion if he could prove his claims at
trial. 178 On further appeal, the Supreme Court of California found that
Moore had no proprietary interest in his removed cells and thus could
not sustain his action for conversion. 179 The court nevertheless held
that Moore was entitled to compensation if he could prove that Golde
had breached his fiduciary obligations to Moore by failing to inform
Moore, prior to the splenectomy and the other medical procedures, of
Golde's commercial interest in his cells. 180
Two property claims were in conflict in Moore. While academic
commentators have concentrated exclusively on Moore's claim to
ownership of his spleen and other bodily cells, 181 the scope of Golde's

178. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988).
179. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 134-47, 793 P.2d at 487-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154-64.
180. Id at 128-34, 793 P.2d at 483-87, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150-54.
181. There have been a plethora of academic articles discussing Moore and the
issues it raises. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Oct. 1986, at 28 (arguing that patients ought to have property rights in their body
tissues in order to control their body); Michelle B. Bray, Note, PersonalizingPersonalty:
Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1990) (supporting the
grant of an inalienable property right to patients in their bodies so as to further patients'
sense of identity); Mary T. Danforth, Cells, Sales and Royalties: The Patient's Right to
a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 179 (1988) (proposing a licensing
system to allow patients to financially participate in the commercial exploitation of their
tissues); Maureen S. Dorney, Moore v. The Regents of the University of California:
Balancing the Needfor BiotechnologyInnovation Against the Right ofInformed Consent,
5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 333 (1990) (arguing that a patient's interest in protecting her
autonomy can be protected without stifling scientific research on human tissues by
according patients a strong right to be fully informed of the potential commercial uses
of tissue before any medical procedure is undertaken); Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward
the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of
Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207 (1986) (contending that patients ought to be
accorded a right to profit from the commercial use of their tissues but ought not to be
granted an absolute right of possession of their tissues); Christopher Heyer, Comment,
Moore v. Regents of University of California: The Right ofProperty in Human Tissue
and Its Effect on Medical Research, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 629 (1990)
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property claim to these cells was also in issue. Given that the California
Supreme Court declined to recognize Moore's property interest in the
cells, Golde was left with plenary authority, within the bounds of health
and safety regulations and patent law, to control and profit from them.
Since the property interests of both Moore and Golde were fundamentally connected to one another, in analyzing Moore it is wise to keep in
mind both the nature of Moore's claim to his own bodily tissues and the
nature of Golde's claim over the cells and related biological materials.
The Moore court spoke through four separate opinions, two declining
to recognize Moore's property right and two recognizing such a right.
Each opinion reveals a different understanding of property law and of
its application to the human body. These understandings emerge from
the opinions indirectly, as the sum of each writer's bold strokes and
small flourishes, rather than through direct presentations. In this Part,
these different understandings and what they reveal about the nature of
property discourse are explored, as well as the likely impact of this
discourse on the human body.

A.

The Majority: Property as Enhancing Trade

The majority of the court in Moore valued Moore's cells and tissues
in terms of market value. The majority's primary concern in dealing
with Moore's conversion claim was the effect that a decision in favor of
Moore would likely have on research and development in pharmaceutical

(claiming that it is inappropriate to create a property right in one's bodily tissue when
the human persona can be protected by the right of privacy); Laura M. Ivey, Note,
Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Insufficient Protection of Patients'
Rights in the Biotechnological Market, 25 GA. L. REV. 489 (1991) (asserting that
patients ought to be granted property rights in their bodies in order to protect their
autonomy); Aaron C. Lichtman, Note, Commercial Exploitation ofDNA and the Tort of
Conversion: A Physician May Not Destroy a Patient's Interest in Her Body-Matter, 34
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 531 (1989) (arguing that, in order to control the use to which one's
body is put, patients ought to be accorded a property right in their bodies); Patricia A.
Martin & Martin L. Lagod, Biotechnology and the Commercial Use of Human Cells:
Toward an Organic View of Life and Technology, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 211 (1989) (contending that the recognition of a property right in one's
tissues carries the connotation that tissue is a commodity); Randy W. Marusyk &
Margaret S. Swain, Comment, A Question of Property Rights in the Human Body, 21
OTTAWA L. REV. 351 (1989) (claiming that the commercial sale of human tissue is not
compatible with society's moral and ethical standards for the treatment of the human
body); Patricia M. Parker, Comment, Recognizing Property Interests in Bodily Tissues:
A Need for Legislative Guidance, 10 J. LEGAL MED. 357 (1989) (advocating the
enactment oflegislation to protect a patient's interests in the monetary benefits derived
by hospitals and researchers from the patient's unique tissues); RUSSELL SCOTT, THE
BODY AS PROPERTY ( 1981) (concluding that donors of tissue should only be compensated for expenses and not for tissue itself).
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products. 182 Granting Moore a property right in his own tissues, the
majority held, would impede future research and development using
human biological materials. 183 Every researcher into whose hands a
patient's tissue passed would be liable for conversion unless the patient
had previously agreed to sell the tissue. Researchers would be unwilling
to use tissues collected by others because of uncertainty over whether the
donor of the tissue had adequately consented to the use of the tissue for
research and commercial development. Such tissues would amount to
"a ticket in a litigation lottery." 184 Similarly, '"companies [would be]
unlikely to invest heavily in developing, manufacturing, or marketing a
product when uncertainty about clear title exists. "'185 Therefore, held
the majority, the grant of a property right to Moore in his own tissues
would hinder the free exchange of human biological materials and
would, ultimately, lead to a reduction in the production of pharmaceutical products. 186 Since the allocation of a property right to Moore in
his tissues would hinder trade in such tissues, the majority concluded
that Moore ought not to be granted such a right. 187 On the other hand,
because trade is enhanced by granting researchers and pharmaceutical
companies property rights to human biological material, this encourages
heavy investment in the development and production of new drugs that
will be traded on the market. Thus, property rights ought to be granted
to such researchers and pharmaceutical companies.

182. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 143-47, 793 P.2d at 493-96, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160-63.
183. Id. at 144, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
184. Id. at 146, 793 P.2d at 495-96, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63 (Panelli, J.).
185. Id. (quoting OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTABA-337, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES
AND CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT 27 (1987)).
186. Id. at 144-45, 793 P.2d at 494-95, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161-62. In reaching this
conclusion, the majority referred to some of the anticipated negative effects of holding
that patients have a property right in their tissues:
The extension of conversion Jaw into this area will hinder research by
restricting access to the necessary raw materials. Thousands of human cell
lines already exist in tissue repositories . . . . These repositories respond to
tens of thousands ofrequests for samples annually .... At present, human cell
lines are routinely copied and distributed to other researchers for experimental
purposes, usually free of charge. This exchange of scientific materials, which
still is relatively free and efficient, will surely be compromised if each cell
sample becomes the potential subject matter of a lawsuit.
Id. ( citations and footnotes omitted).
187. Id. at 147, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
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Although the majority did not consider non-market values in its
rejection of Moore's property claims, it did not ignore such values or
treat them as insignificant; rather, the majority recognized that the
human body is valuable in ways beyond its market price. 188 In fact,
in order to address the body's importance to individual autonomy, the
majority extended the law of informed consent to require physicians
such as Golde to inform their patients of any commercial interest they
may have in their patients' tissues. When deliberating over whether to
undergo the splenectomy, the majority held, Moore should have
possessed information not only pertaining to the benefits and dangers of
the operation itself, but also to the quality of the advice Golde was
providing to him. The majority sought to guarantee the latter type of
information by requiring physicians to inform patients of factors, such
as outside commercial interests, that a patient may reasonably believe to
have influenced the physician's recommendations. 189
It is notable, however, that the majority was unwilling to go beyond
its extension of the law of informed consent and invoke the law of
property to protect Moore's autonomy. 190 This unwillingness prevailed
despite the fact that the informed consent remedy is less effective in
reaching the goal of autonomy than would be a property right. A patient
facing serious illness is unlikely to withhold consent to a necessary
medical procedure simply because an attending physician discloses a
commercial interest in the patient's tissues. The physician, not the
patient, possesses the expert knowledge required to determine treatment. 191 The patient is, therefore, in no position either to second-guess
the physician's recommendations or to determine whether the physician's
commercial interests played a role in the formulation of these recommendations.

188. See id. at 140, 793 P.2d at 491, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
189. Id. at 130, 133, 793 P.2d at 483, 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 151, 153.
190. Id. at 140, 793 P.2d at 491, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158. The majority stated that
other ways of valuing the body ought to be protected outside the law of property, for
example, by the law of informed consent:
Yet one may earnestly wish to protect privacy and dignity without accepting
the extremely problematic conclusion that interference with those interests
amounts to a conversion of personal property. Nor is it necessary to force the
round pegs of "privacy" and "dignity" into the square hole of "property" in
order to protect the patient, since the fiduciary-duty and informed-consent
theories protect these interests directly by requiring full disclosure.

Id.
191. See EVANS, supra note 10, at 71-73; G.M. Ginsberg, Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Value of Life in Health Care and Prevention, in
COSTS AND BENEFITS IN HEALTH CARE AND PREVENTION: AN INIBRNATIONAL
APPROACH TO PRIORITIES IN MEDICINE 6, 6-7 (U. Laaser et al. eds., 1990).

1206

[VOL. 32: 1167, 1995]

Owning Our Bodies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Thus, the requirement that physicians inform patients of potentially
conflicting interests provides little check on the influence that these
interests have on physicians' recommendations and only minimally
enhances patients' ability to make autonomous medical decisions. On
the other hand, a property right in tissue could be formulated to reduce
the likelihood that a physician would be influenced by his or her
commercial interests in a patient's tissue. Because a physician would
have to bargain with a patient for commercial rights to tissue after the
completion of medical treatment, the physician is less likely to be
influenced by commercial considerations when formulating and
recommending such treatment. Further, if patients retained property
rights in their tissues following surgical removal, patients would retain
the right to dispose of their tissues following the successful completion
of their treatment. At this time, the patient would be in a significantly
better position to evaluate whether to consent to the commercial use of
his or her tissues. The patient's position would have improved both
because the patient would be less dependent on the physician's ability
to treat the patient's illness and because the patient would no longer be
living under the cloud of his or her illness.
B.

Justice Broussard: Human Biological Materials Are Already
Property

Justice Broussard, in his dissent, accepted the majority's equation of
property rights with the enhancement of trade in market goods. He
argued, however, that human biological materials are, for better or
worse, market goods. 192 Physicians, researchers, and pharmaceutical
companies exchange such materials, increasingly for a fee, and apply for
and receive patents for such materials as they would for any market
good. Justice Broussard stated that given that human biological

192. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 160, 793 P.2d at 506, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (Broussard,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Broussard stated, "[T]he majority's
rejection of plaintiff's conversion cause of action does not mean that body parts may not
be bought or sold for research or commercial purposes or that no private individual or
entity may benefit economically from the fortuitous value of plaintiffs diseased cells."
Id.
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materials are already traded on the market, there is no reason not to
recognize the patient's economic interest in such material. 193
Jusice Broussard stated that a property right could be fashioned to
allow patients such as Moore to participate in the economic value of
their tissues without impeding research and development leading to new
pharmaceutical products. He proposed that, where a physician fails to
adequately inform a patient of the physician's commercial interest in the
patient's tissue prior to the removal of that tissue, not only should the
physician be held liable for failing to fully inform the patient under the
law of informed consent, but the physician, lacking consent for the
commercial use of the tissue, should also be held liable in conversion for
any profit derived therefrom. 194 Patients, under this proposal, have a
property right in their tissues prior to their removal. Where a physician
removes tissue surreptitiously, knowing of its commercial value, the
physician must disgorge any profits made. Since, as Justice Broussard
pointed out, it is only in the rare case that a physician knows beforehand
that tissue can be commercially exploited, 195 this proposal does not
jeopardize continued research using human biological materials. Tissue
that is currently in wide circulation is unlikely to have been removed
with the knowledge that it was commercially valuable and thus
researchers, Justice Broussard continued, can freely use human biological
materials without fear of being sued. 196 In addition, even if a pharmaceutical company finds that it has inadvertently profited from material
gathered by a physician who had failed to disclose a known commercial
interest in that material, damages are likely to be limited. Since the
most economically valuable part of a pharmaceutical product is derived
from the work of the researcher and is not inherent in the material itself,
pharmaceutical companies will not likely face large damage awards and
thus will not be deterred from the development of new pharmaceutical

193. Id at 159, 793 P.2d at 505,271 Cal. Rptr. at 172. Justice Broussard criticized
the majority for failing to address patients' interests in such material. He stated, "[T]he
opinion speaks only of the 'patient's right to make autonomous medical decisions' and
fails even to mention the patient's interest in obtaining the economic value, if any, that
may adhere in the subsequent use of his own body parts." Id (citations omitted).
194. Id at 154-55, 793 P.2d at 501-02, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69.
195. Id at 150-51, 793 P.2d at 498-99, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165-66.
I 96. Id at 158, 793 P.2d at 504, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 171. Justice Broussard pointed
to the safety, from a legal point of view, of using tissues in a tissue bank:
In the vast majority of instances the tissues and cells in existing repositories
will not represent a potential source of liability because they will have come
from patients who consented to their organ's use for scientific purposes under
circumstances in which such consent was not tainted by a failure to disclose
the known valuable nature of the cells.
Id.
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products. 197 In formulating such a property right, Justice Broussard
strongly countered the majority's principal argument that granting Moore
a property right in his own tissues would impede the future development
and trade in pharmaceutical products.
The majority's contention that human biological materials are not
property, Justice Broussard next argued, is simply false. Even though
the majority did not recognize Moore's property interest in his own
tissue, the majority recognized that Golde and the pharmaceutical
companies possessed a property right to the biological material. 198 In
effect, Justice Broussard wrote, the majority simply transferred Moore's
property right in his tissue, including the right to profit therefrom, to
Golde and the pharmaceutical companies:
[T]he majority's holding simply bars plaintiff, the source of the cells, from
obtaining the benefit of the cells' value, but permits defendants, who allegedly
obtained the cells from plaintiff by improper means, to retain and exploit the
full economic value of their ill-gotten gains free of their ordinary common law
liability for conversion. 199

While the market price of a patient's tissues may be a windfall to that
patient, just as the market price of oil discovered on a piece of real
property is a windfall to the land owner, Justice Broussard argued that
this windfall was no reason not to allow the patient to retain this price
and certainly no justification for rewarding those who misappropriate
this price. 200
The disagreement between the majority and Justice Broussard centered
around how best to promote trade in biological materials and new
pharmaceutical products.
As discussed above, Justice Broussard
carefully addressed the majority's concern that trade would be undermined if Moore were granted a property right in his own tissue. He
created a narrow property right unlikely to stunt future research and
development. While the majority obfuscated the question of whether
human biological materials are property, Justice Broussard clearly

197. Id. at 159, 793 P.2d at 505,271 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
198. Id. at 153-54, 793 P.2d at 501,271 Cal. Rptr. at 168. Justice Broussard stated,
"Thus, the majority's analysis cannot rest on the broad proposition that a removed body
part is not property, but rather rests on the proposition that a patient retains no
ownership interest in a body part once the body part has been removed from his or her
body." Id.
199. Id. at 160, 793 P.2d at 506, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
200. Id. at 159, 793 P.2d at 505, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
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accepted that, whether the courts like it or not, the pharmaceutical
industry already treats such materials as market goods. The central
question was, he reasoned, not whether human biological materials ought
to be property but who should be permitted to hold such property.
There was no justification, he concluded, to exclude individuals such as
Moore from participating in this extant market. To this the majority
appears to have no answer.
The agreement between the majority and Justice Broussard is as
significant, however, as their disagreement. Both analyzed the question
of whether the court ought to grant Moore a property right in his own
tissue in terms of the effect such a decision was likely to have on the
markets in human biological materials and pharmaceutical products. 201
Both accepted that functioning markets were the goal of their deliberations. Both agreed that the effect the decision was likely to have on
various factors-such as the safety of biomedical research, the physicianpatient relationship, and the self-development of individuals-need not
be explicitly addressed. The majority justified this position on the
assumption that the market neutrally sorts out these factors. Underlying
this assumption seems to be the belief that, to the extent that any explicit
discussion of these factors is warranted, it should be undertaken as part
of a larger discussion of the law of informed consent. 202 Justice
Broussard may not have believed that the market was up to the task of
weighing all factors but, nevertheless, he accepted that it was not the
court's role, in property law decisions, to deal with these factors. 203
The two remaining opinions in Moore diverged significantly from the
points on which the majority and Justice Broussard agreed. Fundamentally, both of these remaining opinions rejected the premise that property
rights in human biological materials ought to depend on the effect such
rights are likely to have on the market. 204 Both embraced the view

201. See supra notes 182-87, 192-97 and accompanying text.
202. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 147, 793 P.2d at 496-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64
(Panelli, J.).
203. Id. at 159-60, 793 P.2d at 505,271 Cal. Rptr. at 172. Justice Broussard stated:
It is certainly arguable that, as a matter of policy or morality, it would be
wiser to prohibit any private individual or entity from profiting from the
fortuitous value that adheres in a part of a human body, and instead to require
all valuable excised body parts to be deposited in a public repository which
would make such materials freely available to all scientists for the betterment
of society as a whole. The Legislature, if it wished, could create such a
system, as it has done with respect to organs that are donated for transplantation. To date, however, the Legislature has not adopted such a system for
organs that are to be used for research or commercial purposes . . . .
Id.
204. See discussion infra Parts III.C-D.
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that the human body and body tissues are valuable in ways beyond their
market price and that such non-market values cannot be translated into
such a price. 205 Last, both agreed that an appropriate analysis of the
property law question in Moore must contend with these other values
openly-that is, without assuming that the market will balance such
values neutrally and invisibly. 206

C.

Justice Mask: Property as a Plurality of Values

Justice Mask, in dissent, sought to bring all the divergent ways of
valuing the human body and human biological materials within the scope
of property law. He rejected the majority's and Justice Broussard's
position that property discourse ought to be expressed in the language
of trade. Specifically, he argued that courts ought not to grant or
withhold property rights solely on the basis of market considerations;
rather, they ought to ground such determinations on a host of values,
many of which will have no market price. Only by incorporating all
values within its property analysis, Justice Mask stated, can the court
hope to arrive at a decision that is both equitable and moral. Therefore,
in his discussion of the property law issue in Moore, Justice Mask
emphasized the need to recognize patients' inherent dignity and equalize
the relationship between physician and patient. 207
Centrally, Justice Mask contended that patients must be granted a
property right in their own tissues if they are to maintain sufficient
control over their bodies and themselves to accord with the requirements
of human dignity. 208 The majority's opinion, in narrowly focusing on
market effects, failed, according to Justice Mask, to address this most
important of all values. Justice Mask also took the majority to task for
attempting to take refuge in an informed consent analysis. While Justice
Mask accepted this analysis as far as it went, 209 he challenged the

205. See discussion infra Parts III.C-D.
206. See discussion infra Parts III.C-D.
207. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 173-77, 793 P.2d at 515-18, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 182-85
(Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk identified two non-economic values implicated in
the decision whether to grant Moore a property right in his own tissues. Justice Mosk
believed these two values-dignity and equity-trumped the majority's market concerns
not because of their greater price, but because they exist outside of the market, on the
moral plane. Id
208. Id at 173-74, 793 P.2d at 515-16, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83.
209. Id at 178, 793 P.2d at 519,271 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
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majority's sterilization of property discourse from any infecting moral
and ethical claims. He criticized the majority for its failure to investigate whether such claims could be better protected by a property right
as opposed to a right of informed consent, 210 and opined that the
majority's decision to reject Moore's property right actually undermined
the ethical and moral values inhering in the human body and human
biological materials. 211
D.

Justice Arabian: Rejecting Property Discourse

Justice Arabian agreed with Justice Mosk that the court ought to
openly address far more than market effects when deciding whether to
grant Moore a property right in his own tissue. 212 He agreed that
fundamental values were implicated in the Moore case:
Plaintiff has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell one's own body
tissue for profit. He entreats us to regard the human vessel-the single most
venerated and protected subject in any civilized society-as equal with the
basest commercial commodity. He urges us to commingle the sacred with the
profane. He asks much. 213

Unlike Justice Mosk, however, Justice Arabian did not believe that these
non-market values could be incorporated within a property law analysis.
He doubted both the institutional capacity of the court to discuss such
values explicitly and the flexibility of property discourse to encompass
such values.
While Justice Arabian held that courts are institutionally incapable of
balancing the myriad values involved in a case such as Moore, 214 his
recognition of this lack of competence did not imply that the court ought
to entrust the market to balance such values. Instead of a judicial or
market solution to the problem of balancing values, Justice Arabian

210. Id at 178-82, 793 P.2d at 518-21, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 185-88.
211. Id at 175, 793 P.2d at 516-17, 271 Cal. Rptr. 183-84.
212. Id. at 148, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164 (Arabian, J., concurring).
Justice Arabian stated, "I write separately to give voice to a concern that I believe
informs much of [the majority] opinion but finds little or no expression therein. I speak
of the moral issue." Id.
213. Id
214. Id. at 149, 793 P.2d at 498, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165. Justice Arabian's
uncertainty about judicial competence is expressed throughout his opinion. For example:
It is true, that this court has not often been deterred from deciding difficult
legal issues simply because they require a choice between competing social or
economic policies. The difference here, however, lies in the nature of the
conflicting moral, philosophical and even religious values at stake, and in the
profound implications of the position urged.
Id. (citations omitted).
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argued that the solution ought to be left to the legislature. 215 Justice
Arabian's approach contrasts strongly with the majority's view of
judicial competence. The majority readily acknowledged that courts
cannot explicitly weigh non-market values when allocating property
rights; only the legislature is competent to do so. 216 However, to the
majority, this was no reason to refrain from allocating property rights.
The majority suggested that although courts cannot explicitly weigh nonmarket values in making their decisions, they can rely on the market to
take such values into account by assigning such values a price. 217
Thus, the courts can do indirectly-and neutrally-what they cannot do
directly. 218

215. Id at 149-50, 793 P.2d at 498, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
216. Id at 147, 793 P.2d at 496, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 163 (Panelli, J.). The majority,
however, did not contend that the legislature was better able to balance the myriad values
at stake in Moore; rather, the majority argued that the legislature's superior access to
empirical facts permitted the legislature to better evaluate the economic consequences of
granting Moore a property right in his own tissue:
If the scientific users of human cells are to be held liable for failing to
investigate the consensual pedigree of their raw materials, we believe the
Legislature should make that decision. Complex policy choices affecting all
society are involved, and "[l]egislatures, in making such policy decisions, have
the ability to gather empirical evidence, solicit the advice of experts, and hold
hearings at which all interested parties present evidence and express their
views ...." Legislative competence to act in this area is demonstrated by the
existing statutes governing the use and disposition of human biological
materials. Legislative interest is demonstrated by the extensive study recently
commissioned by the United States Congress. Commentators are also
recommending legislative solutions.
Id (citations omitted).
217. This is the import of the majority's decision to withhold property rights based
solely on economic factors.
218. It should be noted that Justice Broussard's position on judicial competence is
more ambiguous than that of the majority. He argued that the legislature may be better
able than the courts to balance the values inhering in human biological materials:
It is certainly arguable that, as a matter of policy or morality, it would be
wiser to prohibit any private individual or entity from profiting from the
fortuitous value that adheres in a part of a human body, and instead to require
all valuable excised body parts to be deposited in a public repository which
would make such materials freely available to all scientists for the betterment
of society as a whole. The Legislature, if it wished, could create such a
system ....
Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 159, 793 P.2d at 505, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (Broussard, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Nevertheless, Justice Broussard held that the court
was competent to allocate property rights on the basis of market considerations. Justice
Mosk found that there was no competency problem involved in Moore:
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Fundamentally, Justice Arabian believed that if the courts considered
human biological materials to be property, the law would come to "treat
human tissue as a fungible article of commerce,"219 leading him to fear
for "the effect on human dignity of a marketplace in human body
parts."220 Stated briefly, Justice Arabian did not want human biological products to become market goods. Treating such products as
property, he feared, would subject them to a property analysis that treats
all goods as market goods. In contradistinction to Justice Mosk, Justice
Arabian did not believe that property discourse could encompass values
beyond market values. Not only did he believe the judiciary incompetent to balance these values, he believed the history of property discourse
in the courts was premised on the belief that the market neutrally
balanced such values without the need for explicit consideration. 221
This belief, which he did not accept, denies the need to expand property
discourse to allow for an explicit discussion of non-market values. Until
property discourse abandons its reliance on the market to maximize
value, it will remain inhospitable to those arguing that property rights
ought to be allocated on some basis other than market values. Doubting
the market's ability to encompass all values and accepting that property
discourse, as carried out in the courtroom, limits discussion to market
considerations, Justice Arabian forsook this discourse in order to protect
non-market ways of valuing the human body. This was the only way to

My point is that if the cause of action for conversion is otherwise an
appropriate remedy on these facts, we should not refrain from fashioning it
simply because another court has not yet so held or because the Legislature has
not yet addressed the question. We need not wait on either event, because
neither is a precondition to an exercise of our long-standing "power to insure
the just and rational development of the common law in our state."
Id at 163, 793 P.2d at 507-08, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 174-75 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting
Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 394, 525 P.2d 669, 676, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 765, 772 (1974)).
219. Id at 149, 793 P.2d at 497-98, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65 (Arabian, J.,
concurring).
220. Id at 149, 793 P.2d at 498, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
221. Id Justice Arabian's concern about judicial competency plays an important
role in his belief that property discourse, as carried out in the courts, cannot accommodate non-market values:
Does it uplift or degrade the "unique human persona" to treat human tissue as
a fungible-article of commerce? Would it advance or impede the human
condition, spiritually or scientifically, by delivering the majestic force of the
law behind plaintiffs claim? I do not know the answers to these troubling
questions, nor am I willing-like Justice Mosk-to treat them simply as issues
of "tort" law, susceptible of judicial resolution.
Id
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deal, he concluded, with a "question [that] implicates choices which not
only reflect, but which ultimately define our essence."222

IV.

ARE VALUES COMMENSURABLE?

The cases discussed in this Article, in particular the decision of the
majority in Moore, support the conclusion that in the analysis of
property law claims centering on the human body, courts focus their
inquiry on the question of whether granting property rights in the body
or body parts furthers trade in the body and its parts. Conversely, the
courts do not examine whether the non-economic values inhering in the
human body and in human health are harmed or furthered through the
allocation of property rights. The courts leave the furtherance of these
values and the continued development of the social meaning of the body
and health to the action of the market. They do so on the implicit
assumption that the market appropriately measures and compares the
various, often competing, values inhering in goods.
If the assumption that the market will appropriately weigh and
compare values is correct, it is logical for the courts to place goods into
the market. Instead of trying to accomplish the seemingly impossible
task of considering all values and how their decisions will affect those
values, the courts have only to tum over this task to the market, which
is, because of its vastness and its ability to reflect everyone's tastes, in
a much better position to undertake this task than the courts. This logic
is based, however, on the assumption that the market can and does
measure and compare values. This assumption, in tum, has two
elements: first, that there exists some scale into which every value
inhering in a good can be translated; and second, that this scale is
money.
Given the courts' belief that money (the market value) is the value
into which all others can be translated, it would be sufficient to
undermine the analysis in decisions such as U.S. Steel and Moore if one
were to convincingly show that a super-scale based on money or market
value ignores many of the things we value about goods. Such a rebuttal,
would not, however, end matters because it would leave open the
possibility that other super-scales of value exist and that all one must do
to meet the concerns expressed in this Article would be to find a better
222.

Id
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super-scale than one based on market values. For this reason, it is
argued that a common super-scale of value does not exist.
The issue of ranking values on a common scale comes to the fore
most strongly where there are apparently conflicting values. Consider,
for example, the disparate claims of scientific investigation and religious
belief on the body. The body, from a scientific viewpoint, is a source
of knowledge of physical development, aging, and disease. From a
religious perspective, the body is understood as a sacred object, created
in the image of God. The scientist values the body instrumentally, as a
means to acquire knowledge; the believer values the body intrinsically,
as an image of God. Within the framework of understanding of the
scientist and the believer, the body is valued in an appropriate manner.
It is only when the frameworks of scientist and believer make disparate
claims upon the body that a conflict arises. Such a conflict could occur
if, for. example, the scientist wishes to perform an autopsy which the
believer feels is a violation of the body's sacred nature.
If it were either true that the understanding of the scientist could be
translated into the language of the believer (or vice versa), or true that
both the language of the scientist and that of the believer could be
translated into a meta-language, then the apparent conflict between
scientist and believer could be resolved. In other words, if the values of
scientist and of believer are commensurable-that is, can be ranked on
a single common scale of value-the conflict would turn out to be more
apparent than real. While disputes would not be eliminated, since people
will continue to have imperfect understanding based on incomplete
information, they would, in principle, be resolvable.
To help understand, by analogy, the claim that values are commensurable, consider the following interpretation of color perception. 223
Normal human color vision is based on red, green, and blue light. 224
That is, cone cells in our eyes are activated by either red, green, or blue
light. Imagine looking at an object that causes our red, green, and blue
cones to fire in a certain proportion (B units of red, D units of green,
and F units of blue in Figure 1). Our brains register these various units
of red, green, and blue, and determine that the object is a certain color
(point Hin Figure 1). Call this last color simply "color."

223. This example is chosen purposely. While most people take color perception
for granted, it is far from straightforward. See, e.g., DENNETT, supra note 98, at 369-97.
224. Id at 377.
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A.

Valuing Color
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Figure 1

With this example in mind, we may ask whether colors are commensurable. That is, can the colors of different objects be placed upon a
common scale and ranked? It must first be noted that one cannot simply
compare measurements of red, green, and blue on a common scale. If
we could, then B units of red, D units of green, and F units of blue
would equal D units of red, F units of green, and B units of blue, which
they clearly do not. (This would be equivalent to saying that a certain
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hue of brown is equal to a certain hue of purple.) Such a statement is
meaningless since no one with color vision could make sense of it.
One can nonetheless attempt to establish a common measure for color
in various ways. First, one can take one of the three sense perceptions
that go into the determination of color-that is, either the firing of red,
green, or blue cones in the eyes-to be the one really authentic
perception of color and then compare colors based on that perception.
That is, one can reduce color determination to one common factor, say
green, and simply determine whether a particular color is more or less
green than another. If one wants to maximize color, one can simply
choose the most "green" object (the one that has the most units of green
in it). In Figure 1, for example, the color corresponding to point H has
D units of green.
While reducing color to the firing of green cones has the advantage of
ranking colors on a common scale, it does so at the loss of much that is
interesting about color: the redness, blueness, and the combination redblueness. Some of this richness can be restored if we measure all color
in terms of, for example, red-greenness (point C in Figure 1). This,
however, not only fails to capture all there is about color, specifically its
blueness, but does not even provide a meaningful standard against which
to measure color. While we do know B units of red and D units of
green are greater than B units of red by itself, are they equal, greater, or
less than D units of red and B units of green?
A more propitious tack would be to find a common scale outside of
the firings of red, green, or blue cones in the eye. For example, one can
simply calculate the length of the line AH in Figure 1. This length can
be measured against the length of any other color to determine whether
one color is greater, equal, or less than the other. Since the length of
AH depends on all cone firings, and not simply on one type, it captures
the richness of color. Notice, however, that the scale on which the
length AH-call this the color super-scale-is measured has no
counterpart in the world. That is, nowhere in the process of determining
color does the length AH figure: the brain determines color from the
raw data of red, green, and blue cone firings, without ever calculating
the length AH. Thus, while the measurement of the line AH captures
some of the complexity of color, it does not, in any meaningful way,
correspond to the sensory perception of color. The ranking of one color
ahead of another based on the measurement AH is an artifice that, while
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providing one way to talk about color, does not in any way correspond
to the way we feel or think about color. 225
B.

The Lack of a Meta-Scale

The enterprise of attempting to rank color on some meta-scale, such
as the measurement of the line AH, is a hopeless one. The determination of the color of an object depends not on the number of red, green,
and blue cone firings occurring in the eye, but on the surface properties
of the object, general lighting conditions, and the color of nearby
objects. 226 Painters have long known that altering the juxtaposition of
pigments on a canvas changes one's determination of what colors one
sees. Photographers constantly deal with problems associated with
lighting conditions. When a photograph is taken in sunlight, an object
has a different color on the resulting negative than when it is photographed under incandescent lighting. The photographer compensates for
this effect by selecting film that is sensitive to the particular lighting
conditions. The human determination of color, however, more or less
compensates for this change in lighting. Colors appear more or less
stable to us under differing light conditions. 227 Thus, our brains use
information not only from the firing cones but also from the surrounding
environment to make color determinations.
The appropriateness of a color also depends on the surrounding
environment. Not only neighboring colors, but the size and purpose of
the location in which the color appears help to determine whether it is
suitable or not. Dark brown may be congenial in a bar, but it is
awkward in an infant's nursery. A small patch of a bright color, say

225. The color super-scale bears the same relationship to color as a meta-language
of value bears to values. James Griffin suggested that "value" could be ranked on a
scale of"well-being," which he argues makes values commensurable. JAMES GRIFFIN,
WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 89-90 (1986).
This is analogous to the claim that color can be ranked on a color super-scale. In neither
case, as Griffin points out, is there any recourse to a "super-value." Id at 89. That is,
the color super-scale and the scale of well-being do not measure substantive units of
"color" or "well-being"; rather, the color super-scale ranks colors according to a
particular and, as stated in the text, artificial conception of colorfulness while the scale
of well-being ranks values according to their contribution to a particular notion of wellbeing.
226. See DENNETT, supra note 98, at 375.
227. Our determination of color is not perfect, however. That is why we often take
objects, particularly clothing, into sunlight to determine their "real" color.
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pink, may liven up a room which would be made unbearable if the
entire room were painted in that color. Sometimes, a color is appropriate not because a better color cannot be found, but because it is neutral.
For example, a room may look best painted fuchsia-in terms of giving
the feeling of space, warmth, light, and comfort, but we may nevertheless paint the room white because white is more in keeping with cultural
norms. As long as white is appropriate, it can be chosen even though
it is not the "best" color. 228
Because of the complexity of the perception of color, there is no one
scale of "colorfulness" on which to rank color; rather, in choosing color,
whether for a room or a canvas, we use a combination of skill, cultural
sensitivity, a sense of balance, and intuition. The length AH in Figure
1, while perhaps useful in some contexts to help one make comparisons
between colors, does not capture all that is important about color and
thus fails to provide a reliable mechanism to help us choose which color
is "best."
For much the same reasons that a color super-scale cannot rank color,
no value super-scale can rank values. As was true of one's choice of
color, a choice of which value is most important at the moment depends
on, among other things, skill, cultural sensitivity, a sense of balance, and
intuition. We choose our friendships, actions, and words in the context
of our existing understanding of the world and in terms of the understanding we hope to achieve in the future. 229 That is, we choose not
only to satisfy what we currently desire but in order to become what we
wish to become. 230 We study not necessarily for immediate pleasure
but in order to become the type of person we hope to be. We care for
our friends not only because they bring us immediate pleasure but
because we want to be the type of person who values friendship. We
may even choose to sacrifice our happiness or well-being in order to be
someone that we hold in high regard: 231 we may give up our lives for
a cause or for our people. 232
Consider for example, an individual, Gillian, choosing between
returning to school to develop new skills in the hopes of finding a more
fulfilling job and remaining in an unenjoyable, yet emotionally and
financially stable job. The values militating in favor of returning to
228.
229.

See MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES 198 (1990).
See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 6 (1993); see

also ROBIN HAHNEL & MICHAEL ALBERT, QUIET REVOLUTION IN WELFARE ECONOMICS
75-109 (1990); TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 46-52.
230. ANDERSON, supra note 229, at 6.
231. Id at 60.
232. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GoODNESS: LUCK AND
ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 295 (1986).
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school are self-development, autonomy, and adventure and those against
are stability, financial autonomy, and security. If there is a super-scale
of value, for example Griffin's scale of well-being, 233 Gillian would
be able to translate each of the above values into some quotient of wellbeing and choose in accordance with the highest ranking value. Let us
say that in the particular case, Gillian chooses to return to school
because she believes herself to be capable of greater things than her
current job seems to permit. In the instant case, she ranks selfdevelopment ahead of stability and security on the super-scale of wellbeing. 234
While the above example seems to support the contention that there
exists a super-scale on which one can rank values, when one examines
Gillian's decision, one sees that the super-scale actually played no role
in her decision nor does it provide a useful guide as to which decisions
Gillian is likely to make in the future.
The first thing to notice about Gillian's choice to go back to school is
that she was only able to rank her values after she decided what she
wanted to do. Intuitively, it is implausible to claim that, in her mental
calculus, Gillian told herself that self-development would provide her
with fifty points of well-being and that security would provide her with
only thirty and that, therefore, she should choose the option that most
furthers self-development. What is intuitively more plausible is that
Gillian examined who she understood herself to be, what she wanted to
become, 235 and what her values were at that moment-in other words,
in the context of her entire framework of understanding-and made her
decision on the basis of which choice appeared to further the goals she
then had. 236 That is, Gillian only assigned points on the well-being
scale after making her decision to go back to school; at that point, she
understood herself to have ranked self-development ahead of security.
The ranking of values on the scale of well-being was a result of Gillian
having made her decision; it did not cause that decision to be made.
One may argue, though, that the ranking exemplified by Gillian's
choice may provide a basis upon which Gillian could rank values in the
233. GRIFFIN, supra note 225, at 89.
234. It is not clear where Gillian ranks autonomy since either choice implicates
autonomy, albeit in different ways.
235. ANDERSON, supra note 229, at 60.
236. See TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 47; DENNETT, supra note 98, at 410;
NUSSBAUM, supra note 232, at 306.
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future.
That is, Gillian's choice demonstrated her preferences-preferences that provide an understanding of which of Gillian's
values are more important to her than others. However, preferences
based on revealed choices-choices made in particular contexts with
particular understandings-fail to capture the essence of what is
valuable. 237 Without the context and without the individual's understanding of the world, such revealed preferences tell us little about what
is generally valuable; they only tell us what was valued in particular
circumstances. 238 One cannot extrapolate from such decisions to
establish a value landscape. This is so because choices made need not
be transitive-that is, simply because A was chosen over B and B was
chosen over C does not imply that A would be chosen over C239-nor
establish that what was chosen is better than that which was not. 240
Choices are made because they are thought to be good, not necessarily
because they are thought to be better than the altematives. 241
The belief that values are commensurable, unless we are willing to
accept a highly distorted view of values and of ourselves, is untenable.
There is no reduction, whether to a single good, a single value, or to
states of affairs, that can capture our understanding of the good. 242 It
is not that commensurability offers an incomplete or unattainable
deliberative process; it is that it offers merely a parody of such a
process. In making choices, we constantly balance and enlarge our
understanding of which goods are valuable and why they are so. Our
languages and understanding of the world thus grow as individuals and
societies attempt to balance the competing claims made upon them.
C.

Leaving Out Non-Market Values

Consider once again the dispute between the scientist wishing to
conduct an autopsy on a cadaver in order to further her research and a
religious believer who believes that cutting open a dead body is
immoral. Each of these individuals values the body in different ways:
the scientist in terms of increasing knowledge and the believer in terms
of spirituality. Consider, moreover, that the cadaver is subject to
property rights. Between the scientist and the believer, then, how ought
a court allocate such rights? The discourse applicable to this allocation
is that of the market. According to market principles, one could argue
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
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See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 325 (1986).
ANDERSON, supra note 229, at 58, 70.
Id at 51.
RAz, supra note 237, at 339.
Id.; see also STOCKER, supra note 228, at 198.
ANDERSON, supra note 229, at 47.
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that allocating property rights in the body to the scientist would
encourage scientific research and, although not necessarily in the present
case, increase the number of useful inventions made. These inventions
would be traded on the market and increase well-being. Alternatively,
one could argue that allocating property rights in the body to the
scientist would stifle the research efforts of other researchers and thus
discourage inventive activity overall.
It is much harder, however, to put the believer's way of valuing the
body, as sacred good, into the language of the market. One could try to
argue that the believer would be likely to pay the most for the body in
the market-in order to prevent autopsies-and, therefore, in order to
save transaction costs we ought to allocate property rights in the cadaver
to the believer. This argument fails, however, since we could not know
a priori that the believer would, in fact, be willing to pay the most for
the cadaver; only through the action of the market could this be
established.
The disparate values of the scientist and of the believer do not
translate equally, therefore, into the language of the market. While the
believer could argue against the allocation of property rights to the
scientist on market grounds-the stifling effect of monopolies-the
believer cannot argue against this allocation in terms of the values that
the believer holds in the cadaver. The scientist's position is somewhat
better. The scientist can rely on market arguments that reflect, at least
in a significant way, the way the scientist values the cadaver: as a
means of developing marketable inventions. But even some of the ways
that the scientist values the cadaver may not be represented; for example,
the scientist may value the cadaver for the pure joy of research or
because the scientist is conducting the research out of respect for
someone who died of the same disease as did the cadaver. These ways
of valuing the body are not reflected in market discourse.

D.

The Lack of Commensurability and Human Biological Materials

If, as argued above, values are not commensurable, then subjecting
human biological materials to property discourse may lead to the
allocation of control over these materials without reference to significant
non-economic values inhering in them. Consider again the Moore case.
As discussed, there were several values at stake in the Moore decision.
These included not only the economic value of the cells in the cell-line,
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but the values of dignity, autonomy, sharing, community, identity, and
our understanding of health care. The majority in Moore based its
decision on the perceived economic impact of its decision on research
and development in the medical field. 243 It did not address,. for
example, whether the gains made in health care by this research were
proportionate to the alienation patients may feel from an ever-more
technological and reductionalist approach to medicine. 244 While the
majority in Moore did discuss Moore's autonomy, it did so only in the
context of the decision to receive medical care-through the law of
informed consent-and not in the context of giving Moore the choice to
be altruistic in dedicating the cells to the community.
Golde's primary interest in Moore's spleen was a commercial one.
This value easily translated into property discourse, premised as it was
on market principles. On the other hand, the only one of Moore's
values that translated into property discourse was his interest in receiving
at least a share of the spleen's market value. While it is possible that
this truly was the only interest that Moore had in his spleen, it seems
more plausible that it was just one of many ways in which he valued his
spleen. Moore may have, for example, felt that the commercial use of
his body harmed his dignity; that is, the fact that someone had mined his
body for valuable molecules may have felt disrespectful. Moore may
have wanted to make a gift of his tissue by dedicating it to the public.
This would have made him feel important and generous. Moore may
even have felt that permitting the research might increase his chances of
survival or lead to a cure for cancer, and he thus would have welcomed
it.
While Moore may have felt any or all of these ways about his body,
the values these feelings represent-dignity, charity, sharing, life, and
community among others-do not find voice within property discourse.
This is because these values do not translate into the language of the
market. Thus property rights are, and were in Moore, allocated without
reference to them. As a result of tthe decision in Moore, Golde
preserved his property rights in Moore's biological materials. Further,
Golde's way of valuing these materials, in terms of their value on the
market, prevailed.

243. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
244. Further, it ignored the fact that, despite highly interventionist andreductionalist
techniques in medical care, the practice of medicine, as opposed to better nutrition, better
sanitation, and other public health measures, has contributed only slightly to the increase
in the lifespanofindividuals in the United States. FREUND & MCGUIRE, supranote 142,
at 20.
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Given that values are incommensurable, the values put aside by the
Moore court will not be weighed and considered through market forces.

The market has no mechanism by which to compare the values of
autonomy, dignity, and increased health, or to decide whether a holistic
or a reductionalist approach to medicine is most beneficial. In fact, the
very act of subjecting the cells to the market alters the ways in which
they can be valued. The social meaning of Moore dedicating his cells
to the community, for example, is different when those cells have a
market value: Moore's gift becomes quantified.
Of the identified non-market values implicated in the Moore case, the
health care concerns in themselves demonstrate the difficulty of a
property analysis based solely on market considerations. Such an
analysis fails even if one accepts market discourse because market
assumptions break down in the health care sector. The patient-physician
relationship, for example, is unlike the arms-length commercial
relationships upon which market norms are based. In this relationship,
the patient not only "purchases" health care from the physician but
entrusts the physician to select what ought to be purchased. 245 Thus,
the ideal of a rational, at least somewhat informed, agent is lost.
Second, the cost of the selected health care is usually paid for by third
party insurers or the public purse. 246 The bargaining relationship
between patient and physician, to the extent there is any, is limited more
by an insurer's rules than by the direct monetary considerations of
patient and physician. Third, the patient's health has strong effects on
parties external to the patient-physician relationship, such as the patient's
family, the patient's employer, and the patient's community. 247 These
effects, being external to the market, are invisible to it. In sum, there
is rampant market failure in the provision of health care. 248
The deficiency of a market analysis of health care and human
biological materials is most apparent in its attempt to quantify, in terms
of a market price, health status and pain. These aspects of health are

245. See generally EVANS, supra note 10, at 71-73, 75-76; Ginsberg, supra note
191, at 6-7; Ethan A. Halm & Annetine C. Gelijns, An Introduction to the Changing
Economics of Technological Innovation in Medicine, in THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 1, 3-4 (Annetine C. Gelijns & Ethan A.Halm eds., 1991).
246. Halm & Gelijns, supra note 245, at 3-4.
247. EVANS, supra note 10, at 54; Ginsberg, supra note 191, at 6-7.
248. EVANS, supra note 10, at 93.
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hard to define 249 and notoriously difficult to quantify. For example,
whether one measures a change in a person's health in terms of a
fluctuation in that person's earning power, 250 on the basis of that
person's willingness to pay for an improvement in health, 251 or in
terms of a change in that person's lifespan, 252 the technique chosen
will be inadequate to the task. Valuing health in terms of earning power
relegates the health of the elderly, the young, women, and racial
'minorities to a level below that of middle-aged white men who are the
highest income earners. 253 The willingness-to-pay approach is not only
sensitive to wealth but provides vastly different results depending on
whether one measures individuals' willingness to pay before or during
illness. 254 Measuring health in terms of years of life fails to account
for the enjoyment of that life. 255 Two bedridden years in pain is
hardly equal to two years feeling fit, yet a market analysis based on
lifespan would treat these as equivalent. The proposed remedy to this
latter difficulty is to measure quality-adjusted life years, 256 but this
solution simply brings us back to the question of how to measure the
quality of a quality-adjusted life year.
Lurking behind any method of measuring health status is the larger
obstacle of measuring pain and suffering. Because we can never truly
anticipate pain's nature and impact on us, because we cannot clearly
express this impact, and because we cannot rationally deliberate under
the influence of severe pain, 257 any attempt to quantify the alleviation
of pain in terms of price is impossible. Yet if pain cannot be measured
nor the value of the alleviation of that pain be quantified, then neither
can we appraise the value of improving a person's health status. The
entire enterprise of measuring health on a scale of value is extremely
precarious. Also hanging in this precarious position is the market price
of human biological materials. After all, such materials derive their
value directly from their ability to alleviate pain and increase health
status. If the values of pain relief and health status cannot themselves

249. For example, does good health include the absence of stress, and if so, what
kinds of stress? Does a broken heart constitute pain?
250. This form of valuation is called the human capital approach. See EVANS, supra
note 10, at 252-55.
251. The willingness-to-pay approach. Id at 255-57.
252. Id at 263-64.
253. Id at 252-55.
254. Id at 255-57; H.P. Galler, The Willingness-To-Pay Approach: Caveats to
Biased Application, in COSTS AND BENEFITS IN HEALTH AND PREVENTION: AN
INIBRNATIONAL APPROACH TO PRIORITIES IN MEDICINE, supra note 191, at 35, 37-39.
255. EVANS, supra note 10, at 263-64.
256. Id
257. See SCARRY, supra note 95.
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be measured, then it is unrealistic to talk of a market price for human
biological materials that in any way reflects the true values at stake.
A market analysis of human biological materials, based on the
assumption that all values inhering in such materials can be assigned a
market price, cannot live up to its underlying assumption. Justice Mosk
pointed to two values, dignity and equity, for which the market is unable
to provide a price. 258 Other values such as the equitable distribution
of health care, safety, and the community interest in the health status of
all its members are similarly left out of the market's calculations.
Unless, as Justice Mosk attempted to do, the court explicitly deliberates
upon such values, the resulting property decision will fail to appropriately reflect all of the values inhering in human biological materials. A
market analysis, such as the majority undertook, without a concomitant
evaluation of non-market values leads, as Justice Mosk argued, to a
result that "is both inequitable and immoral."259
Subjecting human biological materials to the market fails to accord
with the frameworks in which we understand and value these materials.
Nonetheless, society must find ways of making decisions about these
materials. The alternative is a series of ad hoc determinations about
their control that may be more harmful to the values we cherish than
would be a market analysis. The lack of commensurability is not an
excuse that justifies the failure to attempt to arrive at a reasoned choice
concerning control of human biological materials.

E.

Making Comparisons Without Commensurability

One way to make choices about human biological materials is to
compare them. Simply because values are not commensurable does not
imply that they are not comparable. 260 By comparable, it is meant that
in any given situation we can discuss the claims made upon us by the
various values that we hold. Within the particular circumstances of a
decision, our values place concrete demands upon us. These demands
interact making some courses of action, or determinations of who we
want to be, preferable to others. We can evaluate the force that each

258. See supra note 207.
259. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 175, 793 P.2d 479, 516,
271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 183 (1990)(Mosk, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
260. STOCKER, supra note 228, at 154.
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value has on us, taking into account the interaction between values, our
goals, our perception of ourselves, and the facts underlying the decision.
There is no need to place values on a common scale to undertake such
deliberation; rather, values amplify or modulate each other within the
specific deliberative context. It is this interaction between values that
any attempt at commensurability ignores. By ignoring such interaction,
commensurability fails to respond to the very real demands put upon us
when we deliberate.
Consider again Local 1330, United Steel Workers ofAmerica v. United
States Steel Corp. 261 Recall that in that case, the parties were contesting control over two steel mills in Youngstown. The community and
U.S. Steel valued the mills in dramatically different ways. The
community valued the mills in terms of autonomy, community, and
reliance; U.S. Steel valued the mills as a means to make a profit. Recall
further that the U.S. Steel court held that, as much as it respected the
ways in which the community valued the mills, there was no basis in
law on which the court could further those values. That is, the only
values that the court could directly consider were market values. The
court found that its decision had to ensure that the mills were tradeable
on the market so that mills in general would be put to their highest use.
Assume, however, that the U.S. Steel court had been convinced that
the market was unable to ensure that the mills would be put to their
highest use because the values inhering in the mills were incommensurable. The court would then have had only two choices: to allocate
property rights only after examining and comparing the incommensurable values inhering in the mills, or to assign property rights based on
market values alone but with the recognition that the law in a guise other
than property would address the other non-market values inhering in the
mills. The choice of doing nothing-that is, not deciding who had
property rights in the mills-would have been unacceptable: the court
would have had to determine whether U.S. Steel could tear down the
mills or whether the employees of U.S. Steel and the Youngstown
community could run them.
If the U.S. Steel court had decided to undertake the admittedly arduous
task of examining the various values inhering in the mills, it would have
had to determine the basis upon which it was going to decide which
values it would further and which values it would not. Further, because
choices among values are contingent on the complete set of values held
by the decision-maker and require balance and subtlety, the court could
strive at best to base its determination on certain of the values inhering

261.
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in the mills that it believed were particularly important. But because of
the contingencies and the impossibility of knowing what balance to
strike in other, even similar, cases, the court could not hope to articulate
rules that would be applicable without substantive review in the future.
In recognition of this, the court could seek to clearly articulate which
values it attempted to further, the reasons why it chose those values, and
what other important values were at stake. If the court clearly set out
these points, future courts, having knowledge of whether the goals set
out in the decision were actually achieved, holding a different mix of
values, and having an appreciation of the subtleties of the cases before
them, could re-evaluate the balance struck in the original decision when
making their own decisions.
For example, imagine that the U.S. Steel court had held that, in its
judgment, the value of community was strongly implicated in the mills.
Shutting down the mills would lead to the loss of community for the
thousands of residents of Youngstown. The court may have concluded
that, given the great reliance that the people of Youngstown had
developed over the years on the mills with the encouragement of U.S.
Steel, the harm to community caused by shutting down the mills
outweighed any theoretical loss to market values introduced through the
allocation of property rights to members of the community. At the same
time, the court would have had to discuss the nature of the loss to
market values that it anticipated: that, for example, third parties would
be less interested in purchasing the mills because of uncertainty of title
and that others would be less interested in investing in the construction
of mills because of the possibility that they would lose control over
them. Armed with such a decision, future courts could determine
whether the U.S. Steel court was justified in its anticipation of the
positive effects of its decision on the value of community and on the
negative effects of its decision on market values. Such a future court
could then re-evaluate the decision reached in U.S. Steel.
The second option available to the U.S. Steel court would be to
supplement its property discourse with other ways, within the law, of
discussing the non-economic values inhering in the steel mills. Just as
the majority in Moore supplemented its property law analysis with a
discussion of the law of informed consent, it may have been possible for
the U.S. Steel court to deal with the economic consequences associated
with the closure of the mills within property discourse and deal with
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community values or autonomy through the law of charities or through
labor legislation.
The defects of the language of the market cannot, however, be
remedied through other discourses in other branches of the law.
Property law has historically been and continues to be such a central
feature of our legal system, and the financial incentives established
through this branch of the law are so strong, that it is unlikely that other
discourses can fill in what is left out in property discourse. The right to
property is, after all, not only venerated in the common law and civil
law, it is enshrined in the United States Constitution. 262 Its influence
within the law remains strong despite the passing years and changes in
legal theory.
Legal as well as political rhetoric implied that property rights gave effect to
some preexisting natural phenomenon-whose concreteness gave an intuitive
certainty and substance to the legal construct. Lawyers' and judges' daily work
with the mutability, variety and multiplicity of property rights seemed (for at
least 150 years) not to have shaken their sense that property rights were
different from other legal entitlements and deserved a special and protected
status. 263

The difficulty with property discourse is that it preempts other
discourses. The conception of property as having absolute dominion,
although supplanted, continues to inform our understanding of how
property rights interact with other rights. A person holding a proprietary
interest in a good is entitled to do anything with respect to that interest
unless doing so is specifically prohibited. 264 On the other hand, a
person with a non-proprietary interest in the good is not entitled to do
anything with that good unless specifically entitled.
Property rights are both positive, in that the holder of such rights is
entitled to use and possess the good that is the subject matter of the
rights as she or he chooses, and negative, in that the holder of such
rights is entitled to prevent others from making use of the good. 265
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Private
Property, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 241, 252 n.19 (Jon Elster & Rune
262.
263.

Slagstad eds., 1988).
264. Honore stated:
The protection of the right to possess, and so of one essential element in
ownership, is achieved only when there are rules allotting exclusive physical
control to one person rather than another, and that not merely on the basis that
the person who has such control at the moment is entitled to continue in
control.
Honore, supra note 18, at 114.
265. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT To PRIVATE PROPERTY 39 (1988). Waldron
states that "[t]he owner of a resource is simply the individual whose determination as to
the use of the resource is taken as final in a system [of private property]." Id.
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Someone having a non-proprietary interest in the goods generally has
only the negative right to prevent another, the owner, from using the
good in a manner detrimental to the non-property claimant's interest.
Thus, an owner of a factory can use the factory to manufacture goods,
can demolish the factory, and can prevent others from entering into the
factory. A neighbor of the factory has only the right to prevent certain
uses of the factory, such as using the factory in a way that pollutes.
The right to prevent certain activity is not always sufficient, however,
for those valuing a contested good in terms of its non-market values.
Consider, once again, the decision of the majority in Moore. While the
ability to prevent certain research can arguably be vindicated through
means other than property rights (in that case, the law of informed
consent), the right to direct research, to share in the benefits, and to
publish results of research conducted on human biological materials
cannot be vindicated without the rights of possession and of use. These
rights are attributes of property. Thus, because the majority in Moore
could not discuss the non-market values inhering in the body at the time
its property decision was being made, it failed to fully vindicate such
values.
Given that the option of supplementing property discourse with other
discourses is not likely to lead to an appropriate consideration of all
values inhering in a good, the capacity of property discourse to include
an explicit consideration of non-market values lies at the heart of our
choice concerning the appropriate method of assessing claims concerning
human biological materials. If property discourse is open to change and
this change can be brought about before property rights are fixed in
human biological materials, then property law would be an appropriate
vehicle through which to balance the many values inhering in such
materials. If property law is either not open to such change or is open
to change only over the long term, then we ought not to discuss human
biological materials within property discourse.
V.

ls

PROPERTY DISCOURSE FLEXIBLE?

As set out in the discussion of a hypothetical U.S. Steel decision, the
first option for dealing with contemporary property discourse's focus on
market values is to open up the discourse to other competing, nonmarket values. This would lead a court away from simply allocating
property rights on the basis of factors such as whether a good can be
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traded on the market, whether certainty of title provides an economic
motivation to create more of that good, and whether the grant of rights
tends to hinder further development, and toward an allocation of
property rights on the basis of a combination of these market factors and
such non-market factors as human dignity, human health, environmental
safety, and self-development.
Legal theorists have proposed a number of differing ways in which to
expand property discourse. Margaret Jane Radin, for example, suggests
that property rights ought to be created in order to promote selfdevelopment 266 According to her theory, drawn from Hegel, individuals need to control portions of their environment so as to develop into
free, responsible persons. 267 An individual grows by investing his or
her will in objects existing in the external world. 268 Radin argues that
property entitlements should be granted to individuals to encourage this
process. 269 According to her view, goods are important in various
ways to one's self-development. Strong property entitlements should be
created for those goods with which we are most closely bound, such as
heirlooms, wedding rings, and homes. 270 Weaker entitlements ought
to be allocated to goods that we value only instrumentally, such as
money and objects we mass-produce. 271
This understanding of
property encourages individuals to value goods intrinsically as embodiments of themselves and instrumentally as means to self-development.
William Simon argues that property ought to promote democracy and
community involvement. 272 He suggests that property entitlements
ought to be created in such a fashion that individuals are encouraged to
view their property interests as stakes in the community rather than as
a means for individual profit. This can be accomplished, according to
Simon, by permitting individuals to alienate their property only to other
members of the community and by placing limits on the quantity of
goods that any one individual can hold. 273 These constraints, Simon
posits, provide individuals with material security and protection against
subordination to either wealthy individuals or an impersonal market and

266. Radin, supra note 24, at 957, 972-73; see also WALDRON, supra note 265
(putting forth a similar self-development rationale for property).
267. Radin, supra note 24, at 957.
268. Id. at 972-73.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 987.
271. Id.
272. William H. Simon, Social-RepublicanProperty,38 UCLAL. REV. 1335, 134041 (1991).
273. Id. at 1341.
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promote political responsibility. 274 This understanding of property,
therefore, promotes valuing goods as one's investment in the community
and as providing one with a sense of place and commitment.
Laura Underkufller 's theory of property, which she calls the comprehensive approach, aims at promoting individual self-mastery. 275 On
this view, property rights mediate between the interests of the individual
and those of the collective without preferring either absolutely. 276
Underkufller argues that property rights ought to be created in goods
beyond physical objects and their analogs. She suggests that human
rights, such as freedom of conscience, free use of facilities, and free
choice of employment ought to be subject to property rights. 277
According to Underkufller, increasing the scope of property rights leads
away from the conception of property as an absolute right, to a
conception of property as a right contingent on the community interest. 278 The comprehensive approach attempts, therefore, to promote
self-mastery within while maintaining collective interests as well. 279
Like Radin 's theory, this understanding of property encourages
individuals to value goods as means to self-development. In addition,
like social-republican property, the comprehensive approach promotes
valuing goods as providing one with a place in the community.
Richard Posner offers a significantly different rationale for property
entitlements. 280 He suggests that property rights ought to be created
and allocated so as to maximize wealth. 281 Accordingly, Posner
submits that an absolute property right to a good ought to be created
where transaction costs in that good are low. 282 Where such costs are
high, on the other hand, no property right or conditional property right
ought to be created. 283 Moreover, to ensure an economically efficient
result, Posner argues that property rights in goods ought to be allocated

274. Id at 1340.
275. Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 138-39
(1990).
276. Id at 141-42.
277. Id at 139.
278. Id at 139-40, 142-44.
279. Id at 139-40.
280. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 69-72 (1981).
281. Id at 69.
282. Id at 70.
283. Id
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to those individuals who value them the most. 284 Unlike the other
theories of property examined above, Posner's understanding of property
encourages individuals to value goods only instrumentally, as the means
to maximize their wealth.
According to each of these theorists, property regimes ought to
promote particular ways of valuing goods. For example, a wedding ring
ought to be valued, on Radin's conception of property, as a symbol of
love and a shared life; on Simon's view of property, as a stake in a
long-term relationship; on Underkuffler 's understanding of property, as
a symbol of a socially sanctioned relationship and; on Posner's
conception of property, as wealth. 285 Most of the above theorists
recognize, however, that much of contemporary property discourse fails
to value goods according to their favored dimension. Nevertheless,
implicit in their writing is the hope that this situation can change and,
further, that such change can occur within current property discourse.
They believe that the current conception of property is sufficiently
flexible to allow for the changes sought.

A.

Languages and Concepts

The fact that many differing conceptions of property exist does not
guarantee that we can reshape current property discourse, focused as it
is on market values, into one that invites discussion of all kinds of
values, market or otherwise. Property discourse may be so entrenched
in the law and the rights that members of society expect, that any
reconceptualization, if possible at all, could only occur over an extended
period of time. On the other hand, given the advances in and promises
of biotechnology, human biological materials will increasingly be the
subject of disputes. Therefore, if the current conception of property is
not changed in the very near future, we risk allocating rights to human
biological materials on the basis of an unchanged property discourse that
ignores significant non-market values.

284. Id. at 71.
285. In addition to the above theorists, others suggest different modes of valuing
goods. For example, Singer argues that, through property, goods ought to be valued in
terms of sharing. See Singer, supra note 69. Munzer suggests that property rights rest
upon a plurality of reasons, including utilitarian considerations, Kantian or Rawlsian
considerations of justice, and considerations of desert. Therefore, Munzer' s conception
of property promotes a mixture of several modes of valuing goods. STEPHEN R.
MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (Jules Coleman ed., 1990). Still other theorists argue
that property has become a meaningless concept. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The
Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1980) [hereinafter NOMOS XXII].
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In order to determine whether property discourse is open to change
and, if so, the expected time frame for such a change, one needs to
understand the nature of legal conceptions including how they are
formed, how they shape legal doctrine, and how they are changed. 286
We live in a world that is at once given-others like us exist, we
drink, breathe, and become hungry; rocks, trees, and rivers exist-and
that we have created-for example, literature, cars, aesthetics, and sports.
We create the world in that we shape not only the form and availability
of what is given, but we give such material meaning. We situate what
is given in our system of beliefs. 287 Our ability to create goes one step
further, however. By shaping what is given and by constructing
meaning out of it, we shape who we are. In the words of Hannah
Arendt, all things that enter into the human world "constantly condition
their human makers."288
For example, although the need for food is given to us as a condition
of our existence, we create the meaning of hunger, taste, and sharing.
These created "things" then condition us: we grow food so as not to go
hungry. We develop skills in cooking food in response to our ability to
distinguish taste, and we eat with others, creating rituals of sharing. Out
of the interaction of these conditions with others grow additional
conditions: the food market, education, and friends and family.
Conditions amass atop conditions until we who live under them are
unable to conceive of the world without sweet and sour, companionship,
or skill.
We shape, and are simultaneously shaped by, things both tangible,
such as a chair or a book, and intangible, such as rest or study. Just as
a chair determines the manner in which we eat, our understanding of
friends and family determines with whom we eat. The result of this
shaping is that we come to understand the world not in its given form
but in the form in which we have reshaped it. We only understand
things within the framework of understanding to which we have affixed
them. Food is not simply bare sustenance; it is sweet or bitter, heavy or
light, eaten alone, with family, or with friends. It is satisfying or

286. See Richard Gold, A Structural Dynamic Theory ofLaw, 16 QUEEN'S L.J. 347
(1991) for a more detailed discussion of the process of change within law.
287. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 9 (1958).
288. Id

1235

lacking. It is prepared with care or indifference, and its consumption
emphasizes contentment or loneliness.
As we reshape the given world, we create needs and opportunities for
ourselves. In reshaping food, we create the need for chefs and for
developed palates on the one hand, and for famine relief and aid workers
on the other. These roles shape our lives and contribute to the formation
of our identities. 289 The chef develops an understanding of texture,
color, sour, salt, presentation, atmosphere, freshness, and scent-an
understanding beyond the experience of the rest of us. The aid worker
comes to know of degrees of hunger, disease, hope and hopelessness, of
stretching food as far as it can go, and of deciding who can benefit and
who cannot. These understandings shape who we are and what we care
about.
We do not reshape the given world merely by material instruments.
We create meaning and roles from it through language, art, and action.
Just as a spider builds its web to catch its prey and the beaver builds its
dam to create a home, we create our world through words, images, and
deeds. 290 Language provides the bridge between the world in its given
form and the world as we understand it within our frameworks.
"[L]anguages capture and drive our minds,"291 simultaneously reshaping the givenness of the world and creating and altering who we are.
Through words, images, and deeds, we create ourselves:
We ... are almost constantly engaged in presenting ourselves to others, and
to ourselves, and hence representing ourselves-in language and gesture,
external and internal . . . . Our human environment contains not just food and
shelter, enemies to fight or flee, and conspecifics with whom to mate, but
words, words, words. These words are potent elements of our environment that
we readily incorporate, ingesting and extruding them, weaving them like
spiderwebs into self-protective strings of narrative. 292

Languages are not neutral factors in our understanding of the world.
They open up vistas of thought while closing others off. To have one
word for "snow" is to conceive of one's natural environment in a very
different way then if one had many, as do the Inuit. 293 Similarly, to
think of a family as a married man and woman with several children, as
289. MICHAEL ALBERT ET AL., LIBERATING THEORY 20 (1986).
290. DENNETT, supra note 98, at 416; ARENDT, supra note 287, at 179-80.
291. JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND
LEGAL CRITICISM 50 (1990).
292. DENNETT, supra note 98, at 417.
293. See Jane E. Brody, For Snow the Real Action Begins After It Falls, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1988, at Cl (referring to the fact that the Inuit have approximately four
dozen words to describe snow and ice). But see STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE
INSTINCT 64-65 (1994) (arguing that the Inuit do not, in fact, have any more words for
snow than other North Americans).
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the traditional Western family is usually depicted, is far different from
conceiving of a family as one or more parents of the same or different
sex with or without children. 294 Thus, languages incorporate our
ideologies, or, ideology becomes reified in our language. 295
To illustrate the effect that language has on our thought, consider the
label "illness." While it appears ostensibly neutral, once this label is
attached to some set of characteristics, it transforms the way we
understand those characteristics. As Irving K. Zola explains:
By the very acceptance of a specific behaviour as an illness and the definition
of illness as an undesirable state the issue becomes not whether to deal with a
particular problem but how and when. Thus, the debate over homosexuality,
drugs, abortion, hyperactive children, antisocial behaviour, becomes focused on
the degree of sickness attached to the phenomenon in question (and its carriers)
or the extent of a 'health' risk which is involved. And the more principled,
more perplexing, or even moral issue of what freedom should an individual
have over his/her body, or what else, besides the individual, needs treating is
shunted aside. 296

The confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas as a justice on the
United States Supreme Court several years ago exemplified the power

294. Certainly former Vice President Dan Quayle does not seem able to envision
that a single woman with a child is a "family." See, e.g., Andrew Rosenthal, Quayle
Says Riots Sprang From Lack ofFamily Values, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at Al, A20;
Excerpts From Vice President's Speech on Cities and Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
1992, at A20; Michael Wines, Views on Single Motherhood Are Multiple at White
House, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at Al, Bl6.
295. See Gold, supra note 286, at 348, for a discussion of how ideology becomes
reified in the language of the law. See also GEORG LUKACS, HISTORY AND CLASS
CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST DIALECTICS 93, l 00 (Rodney Livingstone trans.,
1971 ). Although Lukacs does not specifically state that reification occurs partly through
language, he posits that the manner in which we act, specifically by market exchange,
fundamentally shapes our understanding of the world.
296. Irving K. Zola, Healthism and Disabling Medicalization, in DISABLING
PROFESSIONS 41, 64 (Ivan Illich et al. eds., 1977); see also Abby Lippman, Prenatal
Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs and Reinforcing Inequities, 17 AM.
J.L. & MED. 15, 25 (1991). Lippman states:
Prenatal diagnosis presupposes that certain fetal conditions are intrinsically not
bearable. Increasing diagnostic capability means that such conditions, as well
as a host of variations that can be detected in utero, are proliferating,
necessarily broadening the range of what is not "bearable" and restricting
concepts of what is "normal." It is, perhaps, not unreasonable to ask if the
"imperfect" will become anything we can diagnose.
Id
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of the label "illness."297 At those hearings, Anita Hill testified that
Thomas had sexually harassed her at work. Thomas supporters on the
Judiciary Committee did not want to call Hill a liar but still wanted to
undermine her testimony. To the extent they succeeded, they did so by
attaching the label "ill" to Hill. By making unsupported and, presumably, unsupportable psychological diagnoses of Hill, the Thomas
supporters attempted to show that while Hill may have believed what she
was saying, she only believed it because she was sick. Since Hill was
presumed to be ill, what she had to say about her illness was taken as
a symptom of the disease, not as rebuttal.

B.

The Language of the Market

The label "property" is closely wedded to market values. Each
implies the other-material that promotes market values is labelled
property and material that is labelled property is seen to promote market
values. The power of the language of property must not be underestimated. As James Boyd White has pointed out, "when we speak our
languages we cannot help believing them, we cannot help participating,
emotionally and ethically and politically, in the worlds they create and
in the structures of perception and feeling they offer us. In time the
soldier wants to go to war."298
The language of the market prematurely ends discussion about other
ways of valuing goods. 299 This language encourages the participant to
understand and accept that the world functions according to "selfinterest":
[E]conomics cannot, in principle, talk about any activity, any pleasure or motive
or interest, other than the acquisitive or instrumental one that it universalizes.
(Indeed it does not talk about this either but merely assumes and acts upon it.)

297. See David B. Wilkins, Presumed Crazy: The Structure of Argument in the
Hill/Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1517 (1992).
298. WHITE, supra note 291, at 50.
299. Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1884-85
(1987). Margaret Radin would go further than is required here and argue that discussing
a good in terms of its economic value actually degrades our appreciation of that good:
Market rhetoric, if adopted by everyone, and in many contexts, would indeed
transform the texture of the human world. This rhetoric leads us to view
politics as just rent seeking, reproductive capacity as just a scarce good for
which there is high demand, and the repugnance of slavery as just a cost. To
accept these views is to accept the conception of human flourishing they imply,
one that is inferior to the conception we can accept as properly ours. An
inferior conception of human flourishing disables us from conceptualizing the
world rightly. Market rhetoric, the rhetoric of alienability of all "goods," is
also the rhetoric of alienation of ourselves from what we can be as persons.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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This is not to be "value free," as its apologists claim, but to make aggressive
self-interest the central, indeed the only, value, for it is the only one that can be
talked about in these terms. To come at it the other way, it is to claim that all
motives and interests can be talked about, at least for some purposes, as if they
were selfish, quantifiable, and interchangeable; this is to erase all worlds of
meaning except its own. 300

To speak the language of property is to accept the modes of evaluation
implicit in that language. It is to speak as if the primary values to be
promoted are those of the market. When we realize that other ways of
valuing goods are at stake, as was the case in US. Steel, we do not have
the language to speak them. To see the world in terms of market values
is not to see the world in terms of relationships, personal development,
or any other way of valuing goods. While it is often appropriate to
value some goods in terms of market values, not all goods ought
properly be valued in this way. To talk about the latter goods in the
language of the market, and this is what we do when we attach the label
"property," is to miss much of what is important about them. 301
C.

The Evolution of the Property Concept

Labels and language are difficult and slow to change. The law
represents a complex organization of concepts and principles. 302
Adjusting one impacts on the rest; often the influence of the rest
undermines the adjustment. Because of the complexity of the legal
system, usually only small changes can be made at a time. It takes
many such small changes to change a principle, and more time and
changes to many principles to change a significant branch of the law.
Just as the abolition of slavery did not immediately result in the equality
of blacks and whites, a change to one area of law takes many years to
affect another.
The concept of property as based on market values evolved into its
present form over the course of the past two hundred years. 303 Morton

300. WHITE, supra note 291, at 57-58.
301. Radin, supra note 299, at 1877-84.
302. See Gold, supra note 286, at 366-68, 371-73.
303. See Vandevelde, supra note 18 (discussing the development of property from
being absolute dominion over things to being a relationship between people); Charles
Donahue, Jr., The Future ofthe Concept ofProperty Predicatedjrom its Past, in NOMOS
XXII, supra note 285, at 28 (examining property from its roots in Roman law to the
twentieth century); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
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Horwitz describes the transformation as one from absolute dominion to
the promotion of use and development:
As the spirit of economic development began to take hold of American society
in the early years of the nineteenth century, however, the idea of property
underwent a fundamental transformation-from a static agrarian conception
entitling an owner to undisturbed enjoyment, to a dynamic, instrumental, and
more abstract view of property that emphasized the newly paramount virtues of
productive use and development. 304

The speed of change in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
measured over decades and taking over one hundred years to accomplish, illustrates that a fundamental shift in conception is possible, but
only over a long period of time. The legal theorists' goal of transforming property law to incorporate values of self-development, community,
and political responsibility is not one, therefore, that will easily or soon
be achieved. The weight of history and of rhetoric is against a quick
change. Further, as Jennifer Nedelsky notes, there is no sure victory at
the end:
The very strength of the tradition of property makes it in some ways a
precarious base for innovation. When one chooses to use property, redefined,
to provide new kinds of constitutional protection for rights of autonomy,
participation, or material well-being, one runs the risk that temporary advances
will fall back before a long and much narrower tradition. 30'

Since market values are at the center of property law discourse, we
risk viewing all goods called "property" in a very limited fashion.
While this may not be particularly troublesome when applied to many
goods-those that our society has traditionally and appropriately valued
primarily as market goods such as stocks, paper-clips, and pens-it
raises serious concern when applied to such goods as the human body.
Viewing the body while wearing the blinders of the language of the
market may result in legal decisions that fail to adequately account for
the non-market values inhering in the body. For example, the understanding generated by valuing the body as a resource to be mined and

1780-1860 (1977) (discussing the development of the conception of property from the
late eighteenth century to the late nineteenth century). Although Horwitz's book has
been criticized on several fronts, his basic thesis that the conception of property within
the law changed in the nineteenth century seems to have been generally accepted. See,
e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories,36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 96-98 (1984);
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 319 (1990). But
see Alan Watson, The Transformation ofAmerican Property Law: A Comparative Law
Approach, 24 GA. L. REV. 163, 186-216 (1990).
304. HORWITZ, supra note 303, at 31.
305. NEDELSKY, supra note 303, at 243.
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as an opportunity for profit may very well lead to the development of
defective health care policies. 306

D.

Present Conceptions; Future Hopes

It is not being argued that change is impossible or undesirable.
However, while the introduction of a new way of valuing goods within
property discourse will make this discourse a more flexible tool in
protecting important social interests, one cannot expect that this
introduction will occur for some time. One should, therefore, be
cautious in formulating strategies to achieve reform. One should be
especially careful about attempts to protect goods that previously were
not considered property through property law. Although such goods
presently do not get the protection offered by property rights, we risk
allocating them in a way that undermines important non-market values
inhering in them.
Instead of attempting to protect new goods through property law, this
Article suggests the better strategy is to first attempt to change the way
we talk about those goods already subject to property rights. One could,
as Radin suggests, evaluate the respective property interests of landlords
and tenants in terms of personal development. 307 Alternatively, one
could argue that the owner of a culturally significant work of art must
make the work available to the public. Only when property law has
expanded to truly permit a full and open discussion of non-market ways
of valuing goods should reformers and theorists seek to subject new
goods-such as the human body or health-to property analysis.
For example, the author does not agree with Radin's view that women
should have a property right in their reproductive abilities for purposes
of surrogacy, even if restrictions are placed on that property right so that
a woman cannot "rent" her womb on the market. 308 Given that market
values are reified in contemporary property law discourse, thinking of
women's reproductive abilities in the language of property presents the

306. For example, the lure of profits to be made by the discovery of new
pharmaceutical products may entice researchers to forgo research centered on comm unity
or environmental causes of disease and lead them toward research aimed at discovering
cures to these diseases. The balance between pure and applied research may be
inappropriately skewed.
307. Radin, supra note 24, at 993-94.
308. Radin, supra note 299, at 1932-34.
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very real possibility that we will blind ourselves to other ways of valuing
women's bodies, women themselves, and children. For example, we
may fail to adequately consider the effects on the social development of
a child born through surrogacy.
Considering a woman's reproductive capacities as a property right
with restrictions on alienation, as Radin suggests, 309 presents an
additional danger. Placing such restrictions runs counter to market
values. The power to alienate property rights is a central tenet of
property law. 310 Given the importance of market values within
property discourse, any restriction on the power to alienate will be
treated with some hostility. Over time, the pressure to allow the
alienation of surrogacy services may win the day. A woman's reproductive capacities would then become a commodity and be valued as
such. 311
E.

Human Biological Materials As Non-Proprietary Goods

Given the likelihood that property discourse will not soon evolve to
encourage discussion of non-market values, and given that property
discourse preempts other discourses that do not focus on market values,
it is advisable not to discuss human biological materials, in which many
non-market values inhere, in terms of property. Property discourse is an
inappropriate forum for the discussion of how the law ought to regulate
the new biotechnologies and reproductive technologies as applied to the
human body.
In Moore, while both Justice Mosk and Justice Arabian wished to
safeguard certain non-market values inhering in the human body, only
Justice Arabian's suggestion that the body not be discussed within
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 45 n.67 ( 1913); Honore, supra note 18,
at 113; C.B. MacPherson, Human Rights as Property Rights, in THE RISE AND FALL OF
ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND OTHER PAPERS 76, 81 (1985).
311. This path from an inalienable property right to a fully alienable right is one
that has already been travelled. See George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of
Celebrity: Persona as Property, 51 LA. L. REV. 443, .443 (1991). The right of
publicity, which is now fully alienable and descendible, is one example of such a
journey:
Only two decades ago a celebrity had no cause of action against an advertiser
who imitated her voice. Until the 1970's any commercial value associated
with celebrity was personal to the star and entered the public domain at death.
As recently as the early 1950's celebrities could not assign the right to use
their name and likeness. At the beginning of this century the law denied relief
even to the living person whose name or likeness was the object of illicit
appropriation.
Id. ( citations omitted).
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property discourse offers any possibility that this wish can be fulfilled.
While Radin, Simon, Underkuffler, and .Justice Mosk are likely correct
that property law could have developed in such a fashion as to value
goods, including the human body, in terms of self-development,
community, self-mastery, or dignity, property law did not develop in this
way.312
Justice Arabian's conclusion that market norms inherent in property
discourse are incompatible with an open discussion and evaluation of
non-market values carries with it a somber warning of the consequences
of accepting that human biological materials are property. 313 While
property discourse falls into the difficulties described above, those
engaged in the discourse remain unaware of these difficulties because of
their assumption that the market encompasses and quantifies all values.
Therefore, without ever having consciously considered what is best for
society, courts will establish a set of property rights and duties pertaining
to human biological materials that promote certain values, but not others.
Moreover, which values are promoted and which are not will be a
function of chance. For example, granting researchers property rights
in human biological materials and in the products of biotechnological

312. One can share Margaret J. Radin's hope that property discourse can change
over time to include such other modes of evaluation without agreeing that it is
appropriate now to subject the human body to this discourse. See Margaret J. Radin, The
Consequences of Conceptualism, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 239, 243 (1986). Contra
NEDELSKY, supra note 303, at 253.
313. Justice Arabian's conclusion is similar to that reached by Richard Titmuss who
has argued that a market in blood is incompatible with some community values such as
altruism and social responsibility. TITMUSS, supra note 112, at 279. Titmuss asserted
that a market in goods such as human blood drives out the feeling that one is responsible
for one's neighbor:
By contrast, one of the functions of atomistic private market systems is to
"free" men [and women] from any sense of obligation to or for other men [and
women] regardless of the consequences to others who cannot reciprocate, and
to release some men [and women] (who are eligible to give) from a sense of
inclusion in society at the cost of excluding other men [and women] (who are
not eligible to give).
Id at 239. When one sees the poor lining up to sell blood, Titmuss argued, one feels
released from the obligation to give blood for the benefit of others. When blood is
bought and sold, we come to look on it as any other commodity. Id at 171. No longer
is a blood donation an expression of trust that strangers will come to our aid, as we have
come to theirs when the need arises; rather, we come to trust the market to provide us
with blood. Id at 238-39. Contra Eric Mack, Dominos and the Fear o/Commodification,
in NOMOS XXXI: MARKETS AND JUSTICE 198, 217 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland
Pennock eds., 1989).
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research will likely skew research goals toward finding cures for disease
and away from discovering the underlying social and environmental
causes of disease. Because researchers and pharmaceutical companies
profit from selling pharmaceutical products, they have no incentive to
research how the lack of education, the lack of income, poor sanitation,
and unsatisfactory working conditions cause disease since such research
is unlikely to result in profitable products. 314 In allocating property
rights in human biological materials to researchers and pharmaceutical
companies, the court would in effect be choosing a health policy that
holds that health status is improved by access to better and newer
treatments. Such a policy, however, is largely ineffective in improving
health status. 315 In this hypothetical situation, the court would not
arrive at this policy through deliberation on how best to improve the
community's health status; rather, the court would arrive at this policy
by its assumption that the market ensures that health status is maximized
among the citizenry. 316 Another example of an unconsidered policy
choice produced through the allocation of property rights in human
biological materials is that disease ought to be viewed as an individual
problem, specifically a problem of an individual's genetic code, instead

314. See generally John Ratcliffe et al., Perspectives on Prevention: Health
Promotion vs. Health Protection, in THE END OF AN ILLUSION: THE FUTURE OF
HEALTH POLICY IN WESTERN INDUSTRJALIZED NATIONS 56, 66 (Jean de Kervasdoue et
al. eds., 1984) (discussing the difference between a health policy that views health as
subject to individual control and a health policy that views health as caused by societal
factors).
315. Id. at 66, 68-69. It is generally accepted among health policy analysts that
health status and life expectancy are best promoted by social factors such as good
sanitation, nutrition, housing, and education. Id.; see also EVANS, supra note 10, at 3;
R.C. LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY 44-45 (1991) (contending that the decrease in
mortality due to measles and tuberculosis over the past century has been due more to
better nutrition than any advance in medical care); RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD,
EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH 60 (1993) (arguing that the recent resurgence in infections
of tuberculosis, measles, syphilis, and gonorrhea has been due to social factors such as
overcrowding and the lack of access to already-known vaccines); Karen Wright, Going
by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 58 (indicating that
cancer deaths have increased in recent decades and that these could have been prevented
by limiting exposure to chemicals, by exercise, and by diet, and arguing that more
money ought to be spent on cancer prevention rather than treatment).
316. Robert G. Evans pointed to the paradox that relying on each individual health
consumer to maximize his or her well-being produces an expensive and ineffective health
care system:
Suppose a group of people, a society, make their allocations between
(efficacious) prevention and cure on the basis of individual marginal rates of
substitution. By spending less on prevention, and more on cure, they may as
a group have both shorter life expectancies and higher expenditure on lifeprolonging care. (Any parallel with United States health care is accidental,
though the micro-rationality argument does come from the United States.)
EvANS, supra note 10, at 256.
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of as a societal problem. 317 While this policy has been severely
criticized, 318 the courts nevertheless encourage it by granting researchers and pharmaceutical companies property rights in human DNA and
human proteins. Since such researchers and companies only profit if
they can claim that their piece of DNA or their protein is the cause of
disease, instead of the environment, poor sanitation, or lack of adequate
nutrition, they will conduct their research according to a model that
understands disease to be located in an individual's genetic make-up. 319
The disagreement between Justices Mask and Arabian in Moore
turned, at bottom, on Justice Arabian's rejection of the court's ability to
expand property discourse beyond market concerns. Justice Arabian
believed that because human biological materials are so valuable in nonmarket ways, the court should not subject them to an analysis that would
treat them as commodities. 320 The values inhering in human biological
materials, including the values inhering in good health, would be
jeopardized in a discourse in which non-market values are assumed to
be magically considered but are, in reality, ignored. Property discourse
forecloses discussion of such policy concerns as the promotion of health
317.

Abby Lippman has called this policy the "geneticization" of health care:
Geneticization refers to an ongoing process by which differences between
individuals are reduced to their DNA codes, with most disorders, behaviors and
physiological variations defined, at least in part, as genetic in origin. It refers
as well to the process by which interventions employing genetic technologies
are adopted to manage problems of health. Through this process, human
biology is incorrectly equated with human genetics, implying that the latter
acts alone to make us each the organism she or he is.
Lippman, supra note 296, at 19; see also HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 315, at 5, 69.
Some recent developments support the claim that health care is becoming geneticized.
See, e.g., Rachel Nowak, Genetic Testing Set for Takeoff, 265 SCI. 464 (1994)
( discussing fee-for-service genetic testing); Henry Hess, How the Mating Game Evolved,
GLOBE & MAIL, July 6, 1994, at A12 (suggesting that unfaithfulness in sexual
relationships is genetically programmed in humans); David Ankney, What If Violent
Types Are Born, Not Made?, GLOBE & MAIL, July 6, 1994, at A20 (drawing links
between genes and violent behavior); Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr., Genes, Environment, and
Personality, 264 SCI. 1700 (1994) (discussing the link between genetics and human
personality); Genetic Signposts on the Road to Cancer, GLOBE & MAIL, June 11, 1994,
at D8 (discussing genetic markers for cancer); Gene Linkedfor First Time to High Blood
Pressure Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1992, at Al4 (discussing link between human gene
and a form of hypertension); Gina Kolata, Genetic Defects Detected in Embryos Just
Days Old, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1992, at Al (stating that genetic testing can be
conducted in embryos that are just a few days old).
318. Lippman, supra note 296; ILLICH, supra note 142; Zola, supra note 296.
319. See Lippman, supra note 296, at 17.
320. See supra notes 212-22 and accompanying text.
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status, the direction of future biotechnological research, and the nature
of community through its false assumption that such policies will be
appropriately and neutrally formulated through the market.
VI.

CONCLUSION:

NEW DIRECTIONS

In U.S. Steel, the court had no option but to recognize some property
right in the steel mills in Youngstown, Ohio. After all, the mills had
been treated as property by the courts, the legislature, and those running
them for a long time. The human body and human health have not, on
the other hand, traditionally been considered property. The option of
concluding that these goods should not be subjected to property
discourse is, therefore, a real one. We can, as a society, conclude that
the body and health are not and ought not be property. If the body and
health are not property, they will not be evaluated within a discourse that
focuses on their market aspects rather than the non-market values
inhering in them.
Rejecting property law analysis for the human body does not end the
inquiry into how the law ought to respond to the very real and practical
needs of the biotechnology industry. The status quo, in which researchers and pharmaceutical companies are likely to be able to apply for and
receive patent rights in human tissues while the sources of such tissues
are left without compensation, is not acceptable. In such a situation, the
human body continues to be discussed in market terms assuming that
human genes and cells are still patentable. Patients will continue to feel
exploited as their bodies are treated as natural resources by others while
they are not permitted to participate in such exploitation.
If the case of Moore were reconsidered outside of property discourse,
the various values involved could be compared and balanced against one
another.
We would have to explicitly discuss the approach,
reductionalist or holistic, that we are taking to health care. We would
need to talk about the role of the patient in the health care process. We
would have to address the issue of how tied individuals' identities are to
their bodies or body components. We would have to tum our minds to
the meaning of sharing in the context of life and health. If we make our
assumptions and approaches explicit in our judgment, instead of hiding
them behind the facade of market forces, a later decision-maker could
test them against reality and against the frameworks that exist at that
time. We would not so much aim at getting the decision right-given
the many values we could hold in our frameworks and their
incommensurability, there is no right answer-but at making it understandable.
We could decide, for example, that neither Moore nor Golde owns the
cell-line but that they belong to some non-profit non-governmental
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organization, such as the Red Cross. That organization would be
entitled to license the use of the cell-line as it saw fit. We could provide
representation of different segments of society on an ethics board to
make these determinations. The board could, in addition, be given a
mandate to pursue both research aimed at therapeutic uses of the cellline and research aimed at discovering the interaction between individuals and the environment on the incidence of disease. We could also give
Moore some choice by allowing him to choose the organization that will
control the cells. We could encourage Golde to conduct his research by
ensuring that he would be granted a license to use the cell-line in his
research.
No one formula for dealing with human biological materials is likely
to emerge from this suggested approach. This is as it should be since
the values inhering in these materials take on different forms at different
times depending on the type of material being discussed.
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